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COMMAND GUIDANCE by CDR Chip Beck, USNR (Ret.), CIA (Ret.) Formal Declaration Of War Needed

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FEATURES


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TORTURE TO PREVENT TERRORISM? by Dr. Martin Brass

In this article, which is totally relevant to today's "War on Terrorism," the French use of torture in Algeria to defuse acts of terror is expertly analyzed.



On the Cover Northern Alliance fighters walk along a trench near Quruq, Takhar province, northern Afghanistan. See story on page 36.



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


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
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
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Formal Declaration of War Needed

s a veteran of numerous wars, revolutions, civil wars, and even terrorist incidents over 30 years, I believe that a formal declaration of war against "international terrorism and its sponsors" by the U.S. Congress is needed to provide this nation with the legal and moral authority required to adequately address the situation facing America and the civilized world.

A declaration of war provides focus, direction, purpose, and an allocation of resources and methods that a Congressional "resolution," however heartfelt, will not.

Under a declaration of war, there are numerous options that are open to U.S. military and intelligence services which can affect how we attack, literally and figuratively, organizations, individuals, and nation-states that conduct terrorism, train terrorists, harbor them or support their activities respectively. It also serves notice that America is serious this time, and its resolve extends to the fullest expression of national purpose our Constitution provides.

As someone who has lost friends and associates in the bombings of American embassies in Beirut and Kenva, the Marine Barracks in Lebanon, the kidnappings of Americans in the 1980s, and perhaps in 11 September's attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, I know that we have been "at war" with the forces of evil for more than 30 years. With the latest attacks against the United States. the nature of that warfare has shifted to such a significant degree that we must adjust the rules by which we operate.

A formal declaration of war is the best way to do that. While we may not yet have, nor ever have, a specific nation-state to declare war against, as we did after Pearl Harbor, the shadowy nature of the Terrorist International and the transnational identities of the belligerents need not deter such a declaration at this time. The face of war has changed, and so must we.

Some old-fashioned resolve is not out of order. 🕱

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
Think Twice Before You Bring The War Home

BY DAVID HOROWITZ

am a former anti-war activist who helped to organize the first campus demonstration against the war in Vietnam at the University of California, Berkeley in 1962. I appeal to all those young people who participated in "anti-war" demonstrations on 150 college campuses this week, to think again and not to join an "anti-war" effort against America's coming battle with international terrorism.

The hindsight of history has shown that our efforts in the 1960s to end the war in Vietnam had two practical effects. The first was to prolong the war itself. Every testimony by North Vietnamese generals in the postwar years has affirmed that they knew they could not defeat the United States on the battlefield, and that they counted on the division of our people at home to win the war for them. The Vietcong forces we were fighting in South Vietnam were destroyed in 1968. In other words, most of the war and most of the casualties in the war occurred because the dictatorship of North Vietnam counted on the fact Americans would give up the battle rather than pay the price necessary to win it. This is what happened. The blood of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, and tens of thousands of Americans, is on the hands of the anti-war activists who prolonged the struggle and gave victory to the Communists.

The second effect of the war was to surrender South Vietnam to the forces of Communism. This resulted in the imposition of a monstrous police state, the murder of hundreds of thousands of innocent South Vietnamese, the incarceration in "re-education camps" of hundreds of thousands more, and a quarter of a century of abject poverty imposed by crackpot Marxist economic plans, which continue to this day. This, too, is the responsibility of the so-



called anti-war movement of the 1960s.

I say "so-called anti-war movement," because while many Americans were sincerely troubled by America's war effort, the organizers of this movement were Marxists and radicals who supported a Communist victory and an American defeat. Today the same people and their youthful followers are organizing the campus demonstrations against America's effort to defend its citizens against the forces of international terrorism and anti-American hatred, responsible for the September attacks.

1 know, better than most, the importance of protecting freedom of speech and the right of citizens to dissent. But I also know better than most, that there is a difference between honest dissent and malevolent hate, between criticism of national policy, and sabotage of the nation's defenses. In the 1960s and 1970s, the tolerance of anti-American hatreds was so high, that the line between dissent and treason was eventually erased. Along with thousands of other New Leftists, I was one who crossed the line between dissent and actual treason. (I have written an account of these matters in my autobiography, Radical Son.) I did so for what I thought were the noblest of reasons: to advance the cause of "social justice" and "peace." I have lived to see how wrong I was and how much damage we did - especially to those whose cause we claimed to embrace, the peasants of Indo-China who suffered grievously from our support for the Communist enemy. I came to see how precious are the freedoms and opportunities afforded by America to the poorest and most humble of its citizens, and how rare its virtues are in the world at large.

If I have one regret from my radical years, it is that this country was too tolerant towards the treason of its enemies within. If patriotic Americans had been more vigilant in the defense of their country, if they had called things by their right names, if they had confronted us with the seriousness of our attacks, they might have caught the attention of those of us who were well-meaning but utterly misguided. And they might have stopped us in our tracks.

This appeal is for those of you who are out there today attacking your country, full of your own self-righteousness, but who one day might also live to regret what you have done.

David Horowitz is editor-in-chief of FrontPageMagazine and president of the Center for the Study of Popular Culture.

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Pacifism Is A Deadly Cause

BY MIKE ROSEN

Coording to *The New York Times* estimate, "several thousand" demonstrators for peace showed up in Washington, D.C., to protest a U.S. military response to the 11 September terrorist attack on America. The number was impressive for its insignificance.

In this nation of 280 million, the meager turnout was reassuring as a stark contrast to the overwhelming support declared by Americans for President Bush's call to arms in the war against international terrorism. Not all the demonstrators in Washington were pacifists. The usual brigade of anti-capitalists, racism-baiters and America-lasters were there as well, doing what they do for sport. But let's zero in on the pacifists.

As a theme, pacifism is a natural for leftists and liberals. It promises a superficially desirable outcome; never mind that's its vision is unachievable. In this tolerant society we indulge conscientious objectors and exempt them from combat even when our nation, at war, is forced to conscript others to military service. But as theologian Michael Novak explains: "We sharply distinguish between pacifism as a personal commitment, implicating only a person who is not a public figure responsible for the lives of others, and pacifism as a public policy, compromising many who are not pacifists and endangering the very possibility of pacifism itself.

George Orwell noted that: "To abjure violence is a luxury which a delicate few enjoy only because others stand ready to do violence in their behalf." So, U.S. Marines in World War II died on Iwo Jima so that pacifists could sing Kumbaya in safety.

Almost 2,500 years ago, Plato predicted that "only the



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dead have seen the end of war." Sadly, there's no rational cause to alter that pronouncement. Terrible as it is, war is reality. But reason and reality have never deterred pacifists. Winston Churchill once observed that "the only thing worse than war is losing one." Chinese philosopher-general Sun Tzu, two millennia earlier, instructed us that the object of war is peace — on the victor's terms. Peace is not an outcome or an objective.


It's just a state or condition, and a temporary one at that. A quarter-century ago, historian Will Durant calculated that the world had known the absence of war in only 268 of the last 3,421 years. That ratio has declined even further since. Moreover, peace, in and of itself, is an insufficient condition. A goldfish in a bowl knows peace. Defeated and enslaved peoples may know peace. Americans, going back to our birth as a nation in the caldron of the Revolutionary War, desire peace but require freedom and justice. We do not worship peace at any price.

Henry Kissinger put it profoundly and succinctly: "If peace is equated simply with the absence of war, if the yearning for peace is not allied with a sense of justice, it can become an abject pacifism that turns the world over to the most ruthless." On 11 September we saw the brand of ruthlessness that our attackers are capable of. Only witless pacifists would turn the other cheek and rely on the good faith and mercy of such demons.

Unlike the repressive homelands of the terrorists that attack us, and the medieval, theocratic police state envisioned by the likes of Osama bin Laden, we are a pluralistic society. We protect the right of pacifists and other anti-war militants to assemble and advance their cause. But I don't respect such people and I don't shrink from exposing their ideas as destructive and suicidal. Pacifists are my enemy because wittingly or not, they serve the purposes of my enemy and jeopardize my freedom. I believe in deterrence and peace through strength. I believe in punishing those who attack us as retributive justice and as a lesson to others. And I take to heart the advice of the Roman general Vegetius, that he who desires peace should prepare for war. \Re

Mike Rosen's Denver, Colorado, radio show airs daily from 9 a.m. to noon on 850 KOA.

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Even Pacifists Must Support This War

BY SCOTT SIMON

acifists can commit the same mistake as generals: They prepare for the last war, not the next one. Many of the peace activists I have seen trying to rouse opposition to the war against terrorism offer the appearance of a Halloween parade. They put on old, familiar-looking protest masks against American imperialism, oppression, and violence that do not resemble the real demons daunting us now.

Pacifism has never been exactly popular. But when I became a Quaker as an adolescent in the late 1960s, pacifism seemed to offer a compelling alternative to the perpetuity of brute force. Mahatma Gandhi had overthrown an empire, and Martin Luther King had overturned a racial tyranny, with non-violent marches, fasts, and boycotts that were nervy, ennobling, and effective. Pacifism seemed to offer a chance of survival to a generation that had been stunted by the fear of nuclear extinction.

I never saw a conflict between being a Quaker and covering wars. If my reporting was sometimes drawn more to human details than the box-score kind of war coverage, those details struck me as critical to know about any war. I never covered a conflict in Central America, the Caribbean, Africa or the Middle East that seriously shook my personal religious convictions. In fact, most conflicts seemed to point up how war was rotten, wasteful, and useless. El Salvador's civil war killed 70,000 people over nine years. It was hard to see how the political compromise that ended the conflict could not have been reached after six months.

But in the 1990s, I covered the Balkans. In Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Kosovo, I confronted, in flesh and blood, the logical flaw (I am inclined to say fatal flaw) of non-violent resistance: All the best people can be killed by all the worst ones.

I had never believed that pacifism had all the answers. Neither does militarism. About half of all draft-age Quakers enlisted in World War II, believing that whatever wisdom pacifism had to give the world, it could not defeat the murderous schemes of Adolph Hitler and his cohorts.

It seems to me that in confronting the forces that attacked the



World Trade Center and the Pentagon, American pacifists have no sane alternative now but to support war. I don't consider this reprisal or revenge, but self-defense: protecting the world from further attacks by destroying those who would launch them.

Some peace activists, their judgment still hobbled by shock, seem to believe that the attacks against New York and Washington were natural disasters: terrible, unpredictable whirlwinds that struck once, and will not re-occur. This is wrong. We know now that there has been an ongoing violent campaign aimed at bringing down diverse nations, with none being more gloriously speckled than the United States. People who try to make certain American policies or culture responsible are trying to decorate the crimes of psychotics with synthetic political significance.

What price would those who urge reconciliation pay for peace? Should Americans impose a unitary religious state, throw women out of school and work, and rob all other religious groups of rights to have the kind of society the attackers will accept? Do pacifists really want to live in the kind of world that the blind souls who slew the World Trade Center and tried to smite the Pentagon would make?

Pacifists do not need any lectures about risking their lives to stop wickedness. Quakers resisted slavery by smuggling out slaves when even Abraham Lincoln tried to appease the Confederacy. Pacifists snuck refugee Jews out of Germany when England and the United States were still tried to placate Adolph Hitler. Many conscientious objectors have served bravely in gritty and unglamorous tasks that aided the United States in time of war.

But those of us who have been pacifists must admit that it has been our blessing to live in a nation in which other citizens have been willing to risk their lives to defend our dis-



sent. The war against terrorism does not shove American power into places where it has no place. It calls on America's Military strength in a global crisis in which peaceful solutions are not apparent. Only American (and, to be sure, British) power can stop more killing in the world's skyscrapers, pizza parlors, embassies, bus stations, ships, and airplanes.

Pacifists, like most Americans, would like to change their country, in a thousand ways significant and frivolous. But the blasts of September 11 should remind American pacifists that they live in that place on the planet where change — in fact, peaceful change — seems most possible. It is better to sacrifice our ideals than to expect others to die for them.

Scott Simon hosts National Public Radio's "Weekend Edition With Scott Simon."

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The CIA Director Is An Egyptian

BY CHRISTOPHER RUDDY

spoke by phone with a friend in Egypt. As you know, Egypt is not fully backing the U.S. — as it has in the past. My friend gave some excellent insight as to why not. He recounted a joke published in one of Cairo's major daily

newspapers. It goes like this, one friend to another:

"Did you know that the American CIA Director is actually Egyptian?"

"Egyptian?"

"Yes, Egyptian ... because he had responsibility for the disaster of Sept. 11 and actually kept his job. Only an Egyptian could do that!"

Yes, in "Third World" countries like Egypt, America is not respected.

No doubt we lost respect as a great power because a handful of knife-wielding young men could humble us.

But that respect can only be regained if we act tough. As Reagan said time and again, we should strive to be respected, not loved.

It is difficult to demand respect around the world if we don't hold our own leaders accountable.

This failure is noted in the unusual treatment of the CIA director, George Tenet, which has generated little press ink in America but has gained the notice of ordinary people on the streets of Third World nations.

Clearly, Tenet is a responsible figure. Tenet was appointed to his post by President Clinton in July of 1997. For more than four years he has had significant time to make an imprint there — and to shape the agency in his image.

Yet Tenet's agency was not able to prevent Sept. 11. Estimates suggest that hundreds of terrorists were part of a global network that enabled these 19 fanatics to kill nearly 7,000 Americans. The CIA found out about these plans when and where you and I did, on Sept. 11 on CNN.

Since Sept. 11, the CIA director has assumed no responsibility for the events of that day. Congress, which is charged with holding the executive branch accountable, has been strangely quiet.

The head of the House Intelligence Committee, Porter Goss, has even gone out of his way to praise Tenet in the aftermath of Sept. 11.


Editorially, the press has been generally quiet in its criticism about Tenet's role. Nothing unusual here. The liberal media know Tenet is a Clinton appointee, and any criticism of him is criticism of their boy Bill Clinton.

But the Republican Congress? Even the president went out of his way to visit the CIA late last month and to praise Tenet as well. President Bush said, "You know, George and I have been spending a lot of quality time together. There's a reason. I've got a lot of confidence in him and I've got a lot of confidence in the CIA. And so should America."

Perhaps the president knows something we don't.

I spoke to my friend Harry, a recently retired, ranking CIA official, and asked him about the president's curious behavior.

He said, "Everyone wants national unity, no finger pointing. But there will be an accounting in the future. There has to be."



I'm not so sure. And holding someone accountable long after the fact defeats the main purpose of demanding accountability.


We hold people accountable to set an example for others. Accountability has to be applied in a time frame. Winners are promoted, losers are demoted or canned. Businesses that are unaccountable go bankrupt.

It's mean and tough, but that's what makes our whole political and economic system work.

Failure to apply the rule of accountability weakens the system. A system without significant accountability goes broke. I would argue that a breakdown of accountability during the '90s led to the events of Sept. 11.

In banana republics, officials are rarely held to account. Officials keep their jobs despite their mistakes, hence the joke about Tenet being "Egyptian."

In America we were supposed to be different.



Frankly, I am not so worried about the terrorists, Osama bin Laden, or even nukes in the hands of maniacs.

I am more concerned that our system of accountability works. Because if it does not, we will not be able to prevent future Sept. 11s — or worse.

Sept. 11 demonstrated a catastrophic failure of our national security agencies and their leadership.

Rightly, most Americans are not placing the blame on President Bush or his new FBI director. The Bush administration is in its infancy.

But somebody, somewhere, should be held to account.

Former President Clinton is one such person. The former FBI director is another. And, of course, the current CIA director.

Had this disaster occurred in Britain, ministers would have had to resign. If they didn't, they would have been sacked. The opposition would have demanded answers from the government — accountability in action.

But we have discovered that America has been seriously undermined in the past few decades as strange thinking has permeated our minds. Accountability has been tossed out the window.

Consider that since Sept. 11, Congressman Gary Condit has actually been tapped by Democratic House leaders to the new and important select House Subcommittee on Homeland Security and Terrorism.

Congressman Barr has been the lone dissenter, calling the appointment a "joke."

Condit, who should have been the focus of a full-scale criminal probe for lying and misleading the police in a missing persons case, is now given an honor by his peers. Condit has even fired up his campaign to run for reelection.

Condit is not the problem, he is a symptom. So is Tenet. Some of the internal code that forms the program of American democracy is broken.

We need to fix it soon.

The stakes are high. We are at war, a war we can win if we hold to old standards and thinking that made us the great nation we are.

If we do this, we will not only beat the terrorists but also remove the chance weapons of mass destruction will be used against us.

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


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


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SpecOps Forces Strike Afghanistan

In the predawn hours of Friday, 19 October, more than 100 U.S. Army Rangers and other SpecOps personnel were inserted into southern Afghanistan, near Kandahar, to hit the command and control headquarters of Taliban leader, *Mullah* Muhammad Omar, about 2 miles north of the city, and a strategic military airfield.

Likely armed with M60s, M240s,

BY TOM REISINGER

M4A1 carbines with attached 40mm grenade launchers and scopes, M9 pistols, and M224 60mm mortars the units made quick work of securing their objectives. Friendly battle casualties were listed as nil while enemy KIAs/WIAs were thought to be light.

However, one Black Hawk, on-station for a possible search and rescue mission near Dalbandin, Pakistan, hit a sand dune, killing two of its American crew and injuring three others.

The quest to capture or terminate Osama bin Laden, and the rest of his *al-Qaeda* leadership, has been a priority since shortly after the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Now, the Taliban hierarchy is also on the target list.

Given the apparent failure of our





almost four-week [at press time] bombing campaign to flush bin Laden and his coterie into the open, a ground assault was planned not only to ascertain al-Qaeda's and the Taliban's current activities, but also to psychologically inject into the foes' mindset that the U.S. can strike whenever and wherever it chooses.

Black Hawk and MH-53J Pave Low choppers from the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk, off Pakistan, presumably inserted American SpecOps units into their AO near Omar's compound. They met light resistance and captured numerous intelligence documents pertaining to Taliban operations and the possible whereabouts of its leaders.

Simultaneously from Oman, Army



U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) video photographed from CNN 20 October 2001 shows U.S. Special Operations ground forces boarding transport aircraft which will drop them inside Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for Special Forces ground operations.

Rangers mounted twin MC-130H Combat Talon II transport planes, to be escorted by AC-130 gunships, for parachute-insertion onto the remote airstrip. After fighting through light small-arms and mortar fire, they secured the runway and set about formulating plans for future American usage of the location.

The strip had not been bombed, apparently having been kept intact to serve as one of the two initial objectives in the U.S. kick-off its ground war.

A not-so-gentle heads-up has been issued to the Taliban and al-Qaeda networks by U.S. SpecOps that they can hide only so long. Sooner or later, they'll be snared. Whether dead or alive is their choice. 🕱



Anthrax Attacks How Bad Is It?

BY AL J. VENTER

The trouble with anthrax in one sense is that contracting the disease is much like a shark attack. While it can be lethal, most times it isn't. Worse, the media has a field day speculating about the consequences.

The reality is vastly different. For a start, it's extremely difficult to become infected by anthrax simply by handling the spore in powder form such as that disseminated by envelope, unless of course, you have a cut or sore and it enters your body subcutaneously.

The ideal in the kind of biological warfare (BW) perfected by the Russians (with emulation attempted by, among others Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran) is to infect the target through the lungs inhalationally. That's easier said than done.

In reality, the process involves a sophisticated system of disseminating huge volumes of weaponized spores, a sophisticated process and necessitating some form of government involvement rather than private individuals or terror groups. These might be sprayed over a specific area by aircraft or possibly delivered in the warhead of a missile, as the Soviets planned to do, with many of them pointed at American cities.

What is important, is that in order to become contaminated with the disease (which is fatal about 80% of the time) each subject needs to inhale between 8,000 and 20,000 anthrax spores. And while such an attack might result in terrible loss of life, that will only occur if a variety of other factors such as spore size, wind, temperature and climate are ideal.

In the latest incidents involving envelopes in Florida and New York, the consensus of most authorities is that the perpetrators — while deadly in their intent — were comparative amateurs. The attack on Congress, however, puts this in a different league.

Let us look at the implications of a full-scale anthrax attack. The potential threat from aerosol clouds is evident from a World Health Organization estimate that about 80 pounds of dry anthrax used against a city would kill as many as 36,000 people and possibly incapacitate another 54,000. Other estimates conducted for Washington, D.C., for instance, show a higher fatality rate. But why go aloft when a simple subterranean option will provides the terrorist with a better prospect?

Dr. Seth Carus, a Visiting Fellow at the National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research in Washington, D.C., told *Soldier Of Fortune* that in order to disperse anthrax in a New York subway or through the London

Under ground, you would need to produce a dried, milled, powdered agent. Also, size is critical: The spores

need to be from one to ten microns in diameter. "Anything smaller and they don't deposit in the lungs. Bigger and the body starts its natural filtering process." Also, the bacillum then tends to settle more quickly instead of remaining suspended in the atmosphere, this international authority on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) declared.

Carus also stressed that it is extremely dangerous to handle agents of this kind: those involved need to have an extraordinarily efficient containment program. "If you don't, you could end up killing everybody involved." As he points out, producing a dry agent is a much more difficult task than actually growing the organism. In theory, a schoolboy with the right paraphernalia could do that. However, he would first need to find a source of anthrax seed stock.

"But get to a more advanced level," he added, "it becomes relatively easy in military terms to disseminate the agent and affect a very large number of people."

What is clear, is that with Bacillus anthracis spore in powder form, the perpetrators encounter none of the problems usually found with a liquid agent where nozzles and pressure have to be just right. Also, the slurry has to be of the right consistency or wrong-sized particles might be the result.

Preparing anthrax as a large-scale biological weapon requires a sophisticated level of technological skill. The essentials include industrial centrifuges, repeated washings and intensive drying of the spores, all of which takes place inside a specially built sealed environment, and that's not really the stuff of some primitive lab in an Afghan cave.

Let us also not forget that even the Russians from time to

time had difficulty with some of the more arcane aspects of these disciplines. In one instance in 1979, as a result of an accident at a biological weapons factory east of the Urals, some of their own people died when the disease was unintentionally released into the atmosphere. But more of that later.

What we do know is that Anthrax is an insidious disease. It has long been associated with human history. The fifth and six plagues described in Exodus may have been anthrax in domestic animals followed by cutaneous anthrax in people — the same type of the disease that appears to affecting most of those involved in the U.S. right now. The disease that Virgil described in his Georgics is clearly anthrax among animals.

We also know that it was intimately associated with the origins of microbiology and immunology, a disease for which the French scientist Louis Pasteur developed a live bacterial vaccine in 1881. Indeed, for centuries anthrax in humans was associated with exposure to infected or contaminated animal products.

In 1958, it was estimated that worldwide, between 20,000 and 100,000 humans were infected by anthrax. In recent years anthrax in animals was reported from more than 80 countries, the largest epidemic of in modern times occurring in Zimbabwe from 1978 through 1980 with an estimated 10,000 cases. About then I landed at a small airstrip near Fort Victoria on the way back from Northern Mozambique. There were animal carcasses everywhere along the length of the runway and out into the bush.

Military interest in anthrax in the West in the past quartercentury or so — such as with the research being conducted today at the U.S. Army USAMRIID germ warfare facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland — has been linked strictly to defense against its use as a biological weapon. That is not the case in some countries across the pond. By the start of Desert Storm, Iraq had already weaponized a lot of anthrax; some say tons of it. Saddam's intent (recently confirmed by declassified CIA and DIA reports) was to spray it over allied forces moving up from the south. He even had several MiG-21 aircraft, complete with special tanks adapted for the purpose. All of them destroyed in the first day's airstrikes. Were his scientists able to master the intricacies needed to fit Scud missiles with warheads containing anthrax and botulism toxin, these would have been showered on Israeli cities had circumstances permitted.

For years, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) searched for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Though they found some of his nuclear and chemical warfare assets. Almost everything associated with his BW program remained hidden. Several Iraqi defectors have subsequently maintained that about two dozen projectiles primed with anthrax lie buried somewhere in the desert between Baghdad and the Gulf.

The stuff will be potent for a long time, because anthrax is remarkably hardy. This was illustrated by the British, who used Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland as a bombsite for the testing of dropping anthrax during World War II. More than 40 years later, site tests there indicated that the area remained contaminated and off-limits.

One of the signal events of the Cold War was the number of people who died in an anthrax outbreak in the Soviet Union in 1979. In the words of one of the survivors: "It was cataclysmic." Moscow only permitted access to a small group of Western academics under Professor Matthew Messelson, of Harvard, to investigate the catastrophe in June 1992, and then under duress.

As a consequence, we now know that there was a discharge of anthrax spores into the atmosphere after a stillunexplained accident at a military biological warfare facility in Sverdlovsk (today Yekaterinburg) on 2 April 1979. Also, a steady wind, randomly infecting people and livestock for

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about 30 miles disseminated the disease. The first victim died after four days; the last, more than six weeks later. The amount of anthrax aerosol discharged at the time was tiny: In real terms, it could probably be contained on a pinhead.

Under close security wraps, Moscow mustered a huge force to counter the impact in this city of 1.2 million people. Secrecy was so effective that a visiting American academic, Professor Don Ellis of Northwestern University, was living in Sverdlovsk with his wife and children as an exchange visitor from the U.S. National Academy of Sciences at the time. Though he spoke Russian, he was never aware of the drama as it unfolded around him.

By the time it was over, approximately 100 people were infected, resulting in at least 66 fatalities.

An interesting hypothesis regarding anthrax was submitted as a paper in the Journal of Emerging Infectious Diseases in July/August 1990. It deals with an aerial anthrax attack on an outdoor stadium where a football game was being played before 70,000 spectators. This is interesting because it fairly accurately tracks what might happened if terrorists are able to dispense anthrax at a large gathering. The scenario envisaged was a truck passing along an elevated highway at a stadium. For 30 seconds it released an invisible, odorless anthrax cloud about a third of a mile long into the atmosphere. About 16,000 fans were infected and so were another 4,000 people living in the adjoining areas.

Two days after the game, hundreds of people become ill with fever, cough and, in some cases, shortness of breath and chest pain. Some of the sick self-administered. Others sought out their doctors. Because it was that time of the year influenza was commonplace — nobody made too much of the outbreak at first.

A day later, however, a large number of serious upper respiratory illnesses were reported. By nightfall there were already victims dead. Though the study was fictitious, it does make the point that when anthrax is properly disseminated among the unsuspecting and left untreated, it becomes an extremely potent killer.

Ten years later, things have changed. America in the new Millennium is prepared. Though the attack on Congress was a main news item, more than 110,000 showed up at Michigan Stadium the following weekend to urge their team to victory.

The 11 September wake-up call — for all its infamy — played its part in that! \Re

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The Young and the Gutless

BY ROD DREHER

ur enemies know what they believe. They're willing to kill for it.

And, more importantly, they're willing to die for it.

Are the young men and women who may be called on to defend our civilization willing to make the same sacrifice?

Anecdotal information cannot conclusively answer that question — thank heavens.

If liberty had to depend on most of the young people I spoke to in Washington Square Park the other day, we'd all be answering to Osama by Christmas.

"I'm not big on war," says Patrick Mulryan, 21, an aspiring actor. "I'm gay, so I'm not big on the military."

Well, the Islamic extremists our military are preparing to attack are not big on gays.

In Afghanistan, Osama's Taliban supporters execute gays by crushing them under demolished walls.

Recent college graduate Philip Rosenbloom, 21, is also unwilling to put his life on the line to defend his country, which he ways "to some extent, has been something of a bully."

NYU student Jonathan Chen, 20, thinks that war is wrong, wrong, wrong.

But as for terrorists, Chen insists that "we have to take care of them."

"We," but not "he?"

Does Chen mean that other men have to be willing to die to protect his freedom? Yes. Some people are born for that purpose, he says.



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"There are people who are more willing to fight, who have the mindset of killing people," Chen says. "Not everybody is meant to fight."

Chen has "hopes and dreams" of becoming a filmmaker, and he doesn't want to "endanger" them, he says.

Presumably, those brave firefighters who went to their deaths in those burning towers to save the lives of strangers had no hopes and dreams worthy of concern.

Perhaps, men and women who are willing to die to defend Chen's right to pursue his hopes and dreams have none themselves.

NYU student Justin Tables, 19, saw one of the towers collapse in front of his eyes. Still, he is unwilling to risk his life to fight the terrorists because "this is all [America's] fault anyway."

Jason Toledo, 19, is the only draft-age man I can find who would be willing to die for his country in the coming war. He says he's not enthusiastic about fighting, but he would go if America called.

Toledo, an NYU student from Atlanta, says he's wondered a lot if Americans have the backbone to fight such a dedicated enemy. The terrorist-themed Bruce Willis film "The Siege" has been on his mind.

"There's a saying in that movie that the most committed wins. That's scary, because we're not about causes here. We're about individualism," he says.

Toledo cautions me not to take the young men in Washington Square as representative of the whole country.

"Man, we're in the Village. I don't know anyone who would go, even if there were a draft," he says.

Still, you have to figure that you could have gone into Washington Square Park in December 1941 and found plenty of liberal young men who were willing to go fight Tojo and Hitler, neither of whom had done what Osama bin Laden did: mount a sneak attack that murdered more than 6,000 in New York, live on TV.

That was then. This is now. Maybe the Muslim fanatics are right, and we in the free world have become decadent beyond all saving.

God help us. We may soon see.

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More CIA Revelations – Political Correctness Kills

BY CHRISTOPHER RUDDY

hen former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the infamy of Sept. 11 a "wake-up call from hell," he meant just that. His characterization demands repeating again — and again — because worse than Sept. 11 will happen unless we heed the call.

I am not so sure the commissars of political correctness, who so dominates our media, our government bureaucracies and other institutions, are willing to unshackle the will of the American people and allow us to destroy the terrorists and the nations that back them.

President Bush has done a remarkable job — especially in light of the hand he inherited from the previous administration. It is also important to remember that a hidden problem for the Bush administration is that the U.S. government, including our Pentagon, CIA and other agencies, is still largely run by appointees of Clinton-Gore or the career military and bureaucrats Clinton-Gore promoted through the ranks.

The same people who left us vulnerable to the acts of Sept. 11 are now claiming they will solve our future problems.

I believe long-term good will come out of this catastrophe only if we learn from the events of Sept. 11, hold accountable the people in our government who failed us, and make necessary reforms.

If we do not do this, it is doubtful we will exist as a great nation 10 years hence.

We should also heed the Roman statesman Cicero, who remarked that great nations are destroyed not from the barbarians outside but from the civilized people within.

The logic of this is simple: There will always be barbar-



ians outside the gates. It is up to us to have the character and strength and will to defend against them.

Before Sept. 11, P.C. thinking taught us that nothing we do matters; character didn't count. It was the Age of Clinton. After Sept. 11, the overriding lesson is that everything we do counts; character does matter.

Even the liberal Boston Globe recognized this. Breaking from the P.C. crowd, it reported that Clinton's sexcapades and scandals detracted from his ability to focus on hunting down Osama bin Laden. That story got almost zero national press coverage.

And the Globe and many media still haven't talked much about what happened at the CIA.

Political Correctness Ruined The CIA

NewsMax broke the story, within hours of the attacks, about how P.C. thinking by Clinton and Sen. Torricelli had prevented the CIA and its many patriotic members from doing their jobs. The CIA was effectively banned from recruiting unsavory characters to penetrate terrorist cells.

But that was just a small part of how P.C. thinking has undermined America and the CIA.

During the past decade, the CIA has been twisted from an intelligence-gathering organization with a mission to protect America and her citizens — and turned into a model of political correctness.

Under Clinton, the CIA was told to stop focusing on spying and start focusing on P.C. agenda items like global warming. Worse, the CIA staff was to become a model of P.C. ideology. One analyst retired in disgust after the agency had appointed a person to become a lead analyst for a particular country.

This person was qualified because she was black, a female, and had graduated from an Ivy League college with a high GPA. The CIA was not concerned that the young woman did not speak the language of the country she was to analyze, nor had she ever visited the country.

She did prove, however, that the CIA was diverse.

Diversity Defined The CIA

As anyone who worked at the CIA can tell you, "diversity" was the buzzword that animated the agency during the Clinton years. Diversity was the mission and the goal.

A CIA operative close to the Middle East told me that the agency was even placing women in Islamic countries, where the culture does not view women progressively.

While this policy demonstrated the agency's commitment

to diversity, it effectively cut its female operative out of any serious interaction with the host country's political and military establishment.

P.C. thinking dominated all the activities of the agency. CIA employees were regularly hit with a barrage of Orwellian P.C. workshops and literature explaining how they needed to be ... well, sensitive and open to diversity.

One analyst, still a CIA employee, told me about one CIA sensitivity training seminar he had to sit through. The presenter, an expert in diversity, gave a Powerpoint presentation on the benefits of diversity.

One slide showed an American Indian sitting on the ground working with beads. The presenter explained: "American Indians have a long tradition working with beads. They are good with beads, and they have, in modern times, become good working with wires."

Another slide showed an African-American professional sitting at an office cubicle on the phone. The presenter explained: "African-Americans are particularly sensitive to being interrupted while on the phone. You should avoid doing this."

As the analyst explained, "They were creating new stereotypes as they were complaining about old ones." The CIA had become the Central Intelligence Agency for Diversity.

How sad. How dangerous.

No wonder that, with an annual budget of \$60 billion, the CIA had no warning, no informant in the Sept. 11 network that several experts say must have numbered 300 people working in several countries.


Commissars Won't Heed Wake-Up Call

I could swallow the government's failures of Sept. 11 if we heeded the wake-up call, exposed the problems of P.C. thinking at the CIA and elsewhere, and made reforms.

But the commissars of political correctness that control the major media will have none of it. Consider how there has been practically no criticism by the major networks of President Clinton's stewardship of our national security agencies.

The same commissars who were, in the middle of this horrific crisis, attacking President Bush will not utter any criticism of Bill Clinton.

In fact, Clinton was actually being praised! NBC's Andrea Mitchell, Alan Greenspan's wife, was on-air spewing her venom for Bush, complaining that he was not, like Bill Clinton, a "Comforter





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in Chief." You see, according to P.C. thinking, Bush's desire to stay up in Air Force One to ensure the continuity of government was less important than going to New York to cry, hold hands and show how we "feel."

Criticism of Clinton is taboo precisely because the major media know that criticism of him is criticism of them. They supported him and the bizarre P.C. thinking that has possessed them and brought us to the point of Sept. 11.

So, instead of heeding the "wake-up call," the P.C. commissars in the media are continuing to play old tricks.

Within hours of the attacks, I heard P.C. anchors and commentators spinning that these events proved America does not need missile defense. Don't they care that the very same countries behind the terrorists are feverishly building and developing long-range missiles capable of hitting many American cities at once?

No, the commissars never lose an opportunity to spin.

The "Evils" Of Profiling, Arming Pilots

Consider, since the attacks of Sept. 11, how many stories you've seen about the horrors of profiling — and how evil it is for authorities to be checking Arab-Americans more carefully at airports.

Forgive me, but doesn't common sense dictate that when 19 Arab men, all in a certain age bracket, just hijacked four jet planes and killed about 7,000 people, that it would be reasonable to check people who fit that profile a bit more carefully? Wouldn't patriotic Arab-Americans be glad for such a policy because it assures their safety as well? If I was an Arab, I would be happy I was being checked.

Perhaps the most egregious evidence of P.C. thinking that has invaded our government was the U.S. government's failure after Sept. 11 to either a) immediately arm pilots in the cockpits or b) call out the National Guard to fly armed on all flights until a sky marshal program could be implemented.

Instead we dithered. The country's economy has been allowed to fall off a cliff. And the FAA says airlines are safe at the very same time Reagan National remains closed and we read reports on the military's plans to shoot down hijacked civilian jets.

But we can't arm the pilots — God forbid! Even when the head of the pilots association goes before Congress

Continued on page 81



America's Dangerous White Hat Hero Complex

BY JOHN WEISMAN

n the wake of the unmistakable acts of war waged by terrorists against civilian targets in New York and the Department of Defense in Washington, the Bush Administration must end a dangerous form of political thinking about how to deal with terrorism that has handcuffed American policy for the past three decades. I call this self-defeating policy America's White Hat Hero Complex, or WH2C.

WH2C is like those 1930s and 1940s Bob Steele, "Hoot" Gibson, Ken Maynard, or Roy Rogers westerns. When the bad guy came at the white-hatted hero with a knife, Bob, or "Hoot," or Ken, or Roy would toss his six-gun away and take on Mr. Nasty Black Hat with his knife. And when the hero finally smashed the bad guy's arm across the bar and knocked the knife out of his hand, good-guy Roy or fearless Bob dropped his own knife and subdued the villain with bare fists.

You can see WH2C in the constrictive rules of engagement with which America's senior policymakers — often but not exclusively from the State Department or Capitol Hill hav shackled our armed forces and intelligence operatives. My friend, Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith, the soldier who created Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta (better known as Delta Force), once told me about going to the White House Situation Room to brief President Jimmy Carter and his closest aides on the final mission plan shortly before Charlie left on the ill-fated odyssey to rescue our American hostages in Tehran back in 1980. During the briefing, Charlie mentioned that his Delta shooters would "take out" the hostage guards.

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher looked over at Charlie, eyebrows raised. "'Take them out,' Colonel?"

Charlie said something to the effect of, "Yes, Mister Deputy Secretary. We're going to double-tap 'em. Shoot 'em each in the head — twice."

That's when WH2C kicked in. "Couldn't you just shoot them in the shoulder or something?" Christopher demanded.

Charlie told me later, "I bit my tongue, then I said, 'No, Mister Deputy Secretary. My men have been trained to shoot them each twice, in the head, and that's what they'll do'."

From the 1983 suicide bombings of the American Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, to the recent attack on the U.S.S. Cole, our government has stifled the ability to prevent the killing of Americans because its policies are rooted in WH2C. Instead of going proactive, which means anticipating problems, getting to the bad guys, and neutralizing them before they can do damage to us, we order our sentries to carry unloaded or inadequate weapons, or our ships to sail into harm's way without taking adequate protective measures because we might appear undiplomatically bellicose, pushy, or confrontational.

And even after Americans are murdered, our Powers That Be too often respond not by going after the killers, but by forming commissions, which issue reports advising the State Department and Pentagon to protect their diplomats and armed forces by sealing them hermetically in secure, remotely located, fortress-like installations. I have yet to hear about a commission report that advocates taking steps to identify and neutralize terrorists before they commit their crimes, even though we have that capability in Army units like Delta, and the Navy's Special Warfare Development Group (it used to be called SEAL Team Six before I broke its cover in 1992's *Rogue Warrior*, which I wrote with SEAL Six's former commander, Richard Marcinko).

Now, to be fair, it's not all reports and memos. Occasionally, we do actually launch Cruise missiles to hit pharmaceutical plants or terrorist camps. But only, it seems, after following the WH2C rule of making sure they're deserted, so no one will actually get hurt.

Congress is no better than State. Ever since the Church Committee's CIA-as-Rogue Agency hearings back in 1976, the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees have consistently applied WH2C principles to the Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, many of the veteran case officers to whom I speak tell me they are reluctant to target any foreign national who is not demonstrably and polygraphably squeaky clean, because the recruitment of malefactors who have engaged in unsavory behavior can cause a career in the Directorate of Operations to go south overnight.

During the time Americans were being held hostage in Beirut, one of our more enterprising case officers in Lebanon came across a chap — let's call him Mahmoud — who had all the makings of a terrific agent. Mahmoud had access to the inner sanctums of Hizballah. He was familiar with Iranians from the *seppah pasdaran* — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — who controlled the Islamic Jihad. If the case officer could recruit him, Mahmoud had the potential to provide valuable insight into these organizations' capabilities and intentions.

But there was a downside. Mahmoud was a car bomber. As a matter of fact, he reportedly held the Beirut record for




The question is now ... "How good can you shoot?"


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General Microdisplay Systems Advanced Displays From Advanced Thinking consecutive car bombs detonated in any one 24-hour period: eleven. The case officer never even submitted Mahmoud's name to Langley, because he knew he'd never receive POA — Provisional Operation-al Approval to begin the recruitment process. Mahmoud was far too politically incorrect to be allowed to supply the CIA with valuable information that might save American lives.

It wasn't always that way. In the old, pre-Church Committee days, CIA's Middle East-based case officers routinely received POA to deal with such nasty developmental agents as Ali Hassan Salameh, Black September's architect of the Munich Olympics massacre, or trade information with Abu Iyad, Fatah's chief of intelligence, and his deputy, Atif Bsisou, both of whom had blood on their hands.

Now, I'm not advocating that we send our spooks out to recruit somebody to spray poison onto Saddam Hussein's mustache or blow up Imad Mugniyah's car. Nor do I advocate misusing Delta or DEVGRP in some micromanaged, doomed-to-fail fiasco. What America needs is a basic attitude adjustment. From the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of State, down to the lowest ranking enlisted personnel, we cannot afford to accept WH2C as the standard operating procedure when dealing with terrorism anymore. As former Secretary of State George Shultz suggested just hours after the dastardly attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, we must use intelligence and audacity, to protect ourselves. But we must also be willing to preempt terrorists by using deadly force when necessary.

There are still too many officials within our government who believe that terrorism is a political problem that can be solved by political means — in other words, by talking it away. They are wrong. Terrorism is war. Full stop. And war isn't won by high-minded policymakers emulating celluloid cowboy heroes who toss their weapons — and options — away, but by real-life warriors who have the grit to intercept, confront, and if necessary, kill our enemies, before our enemies kill them or any more of us.

Weisman is the author of The New York Times' best-selling Rogue Warrior series of counterterrorism novels. He is currently researching a nonfiction book about U.S. intelligence activities in the Middle East. \Re

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AS the sun sank towards the western mountains we parked the jeep in the shelter of a hangar and began moving on foot, several United Front troops moved out in front, Kalashnikovs locked and loaded. At first the huge bulk of the hangar covered us from Taliban positions 300 meters distant across the runway. Then, one by one, we moved out across the open tarmac between the first hangar and the next.

We were crossing a graveyard. The tarmac was littered with the twisted wreckage of Soviet-era military aviation from another era — MiG-21 interceptors, SU-22 ground attack fighters, the hulk of an Antonov AN-12 transport, next to it an old Ilyushin Il-28 bomber. The only sound was the eerie clatter of corrugated iron high on the shellpocked roof of the hangar, flapping loose in the wind.

This was Bagram air base, once the pride of the Afghan military. Built with

Soviet aid in the 1960s, its situated on the lush, mountain-ringed Shomali plain 45 kilometers north of the Afghan capital, Kabul. Its heyday came during the 1980s' war when it served as a strategic launch pad for both Soviet Frontal Aviation and the Afghan Air Force. From Bagram, strike aircraft, gunships, troops transports and heliborne assault units covered much of central and northern Afghanistan.

Since the fall of the Communist regime in 1992 and the rise of the Taliban in 1996 the base had been fought over and changed hands four times. And after the savage battles that had swept back and forth across Shomali in 1999 it had become a front line, its defense a point of pride for the Tajik troops of the opposition United Front. They held the gaping hangars, blackened administrative buildings and control tower along with forward positions near the perimeter across the runway. Two-hundred meters beyond were villages held by Taliban fighters.

The day before the group I'd been with near the control tower had drawn a burst of machine-gun fire from a bored Taliban unit across the runway. But today we reached the last hangar and an aircraft repair shop without incident. A door in the side of the building led to a staircase, an empty upper room and then a broken ladder up onto the flat roof. With a couple of local fighters I emerged into a sandbagged position which commanded a fine view across the runway and the Taliban-held villages - a straggle of square mudbrown buildings caught in the day's last light before the sun sank finally behind the rim of mountains to the west.

That night two wars were converging: The first — on front lines before me was between the forces of the northern-based United Front and the southern Taliban movement determined to conquer all Afghanistan in the name of an extremist interpretation of Islam

The Rockets' Red Glare SOF On The Ground In Afghanistan


TEXT & PHOTOS BY MIKE WINCHESTER



(left) United Front jeep patrol. UF army engineers have fitted newly-purchased Russian jeeps with a range of supporting weapon systems: MBRLs, 12.7 HMGs, even 57mm rocket pods cannibalized from Mi-35 Hinds.

that had left even the *mullahs* of neighboring Iran shaking their heads in anger and bewilderment. The second was America's war on global terror that as a result of the attacks of 11 September had finally defined Saudi renegade Osama bin Laden and his *al-Qaeda* network as enemy No.1 and Afghanistan as the world's foremost terrorist sanctuary and training base.

Following the refusal of Taliban "Commander-of-the-Faithful" Mullah Mohammad Omar to hand over bin Laden, U.S. strikes by jets and cruise missiles had begun on the evening of 7 October. They targeted Taliban military infrastructure, communications, command & control and aviation assets, in and around Kabul, southern Kandahar, the eastern center of Jalalabad, and northern Mazar-i-Sharif. Six days later,



one UF intel officer told me, the good news was that some 200 Talibs and allies had been killed and Taliban air assets almost all destroyed. The bad news was that thousands of Taliban and foreign militants had streamed out of the city to reinforce the front line. The question now exercising the UF was whether and when Washington would shift strikes north from the city and its now crippled military infrastructure and start hitting high-value targets on the front line.

It wasn't that night. We sat crouched in the darkness on the roof waiting for a show that I knew would begin around 2200 or 2300 hours. When the curtain went up I was hoping to have a frontrow seat for a pounding of Taliban and allied assets — tanks, artillery and troops — in the villages beyond the air(Top) UF local Uzbek fighter on front-line west of the Kokcha river. Plenty of walls, fields and trees for cover and concealment. (left) UF tank — no longer mobile — on the front line on the Old Road, some 50 klicks north of Kabul. Taliban positions visible down the road.(right) UF military officials during chopper flight.

base perimeter. What I got around 2230 hours was more of the same — the red and white flashes flickering across the hills screening Kabul. The horizon to the south that indicated targets in or near the city were again being hit.

Taliban Tales

But eradicating the infrastructure of terror in Afghanistan was going to take a lot more than hitting empty training camps and urban C3I infrastructure. Forced by U.S. diplomatic pressure to leave Sudan, Osama bin Laden returned to his old stamping grounds in eastern Afghanistan in May 1996. By August, he was involved in financing the Taliban campaign in the southeast and in September their seizure of Kabul. His alliance with al-Qaeda Arabs who had remained in Afghanistan after the fall of communism in 1992; and then turn to the work of building up both an infrastructure of training camps and a small foreign legion to fight with the Taliban. The aim: to establish Taliban control over all Afghanistan and then use the country as a base from which to project a radical interpretation of Islam worldwide.

Between late 1996 and 2001 the Taliban foreign legion grew steeply.

Composed of a hard core of around 2,500 Arabs personally loyal to bin Laden, it also included thousands of Pakistani militants from a range of religious parties; and later expanded to include Chechens, Central Asians of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and even some radicals from Southeast Asia. By early 2001 foreign militant presence, inspired and financed by bin laden, was estimated by western military sources to number some 8,000-12,000 armed effectives. With Taliban forces numbering some 45,000-50,000 countrywide, that translated into between one-fifth and onequarter of overall strength. Well-armed in some cases with armored vehicles and artillery, foreign units became increasingly important militarily and by 2000 had become the cutting edge of the Taliban war machine.


Training camps across the south and east meanwhile provide instruction in both basic small arms and support weaponry use as well as more advanced courses for terrorist skills such as explosives and demolition.

The increasing military prominence of his foreign legion along with his own financial backing gave bin Laden growing political clout in Taliban leadership. Since 1996 he established a friendship with Mullah Omar, a personal relationship cemented by the convergence of purist religious views between bin Laden's strict Wahhabi views and the Deobandi purism of the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani backers. Arab influence at the top of the Taliban movement resulted in the growing power of the the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice. It also translated into the regime's growing anti-Westernism, increasing harassment of Western aid organizations and wholly un-Afghan acts of iconoclasm, notably the destruction of the ancient Buddhist statues in Bamiyan.

In short, by 11 September and the attacks on Washington and New York, bin Laden's infrastructure in Afghanistan had become increasingly inseparable from the military and political machine of his Taliban hosts. This state of affairs confronted the U.S. military with a stark imperative: uprooting the infrastructure of terror in Afghanistan demanded dismantling the whole edifice of Taliban power.

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Catastrophe struck the United Front on 9 September when two Arab suicide bombers disguised as journalists succeeded in gaining access to Massoud at his Khwaja Bahauddin headquarters near the Tajikistan border and fatally wounding him during an interview.

poised on a front line just 45 kilometers north of the capital, there was no way the United Front was not going to be involved in the final fall of the Taliban and the terrorist army that they had come to rely on.

Also known as the Northern Alliance, the UF had been cobbled together back in 1996 following the seizure of Kabul by the Pakistan-backed Taliban. It brought together an uneasy coalition a group of northern minority groups: the mainly ethnic Tajik forces of the Islamic State of Afghanistan led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani and his military sword-arm Ahmadshah Massoud; the Uzbek National Islamic movement led by a hard-drinking excommunist militia boss, Abdul Rashid Dostam; and the Shi'ite Hizb Wahdat Islami (Islamic Unity Party) based in the central Hazarajat region.

Between 1997 and 2000 the United Front suffered a string of defeats at the hands of a Taliban army backed by Pakistani military intelligence with covert assistance in logistics, planning and recruitment. In a summer campaign in 1998 Taliban forces swept through Dostam's northwestern stronghold overrunning the northern center of Mazar-i-Sharif in early August before veering south into the Hazarajat and routing the Shi'ite forces. That that left Ahmadshah Massoud, hero of the anti-Soviet war struggling to defend his own ethnic Tajik stronghold in the rugged northeastern corner of the country.

Resistance in the northeast took its hardest hit in late 2000. In September Taliban forces finally seized Massoud's northeast capital of Taloqan after a blistering 33-day battle of attrition in which Massoud lost some 700 men KIA — his highest ever losses over a onemonth period. At least one Western intel service had good reason to believe that in addition to the thousands of Pakistani and Arab militants in the Taliban foreign legion, Pakistani regular forces — probably units of the elite Special Services Group (SSG) - were also involved in the battle in support of the Taliban.

The loss of the city cut Massoud's vital north-south logistics line between the northen border with Tajikistan and his Panjshir Valley and forces on the plain north of Kabul. Lying across the Hindu Kush range, the 100-kilomter long Panjshir both communications artery and a base area — constituted the strategic pivot of Massoud's backs-to-the-wall defence of the northeast.

Over the winter of 2000-2001 Massoud succeeded in revitalizing his airlift capability, reduced at the time of Taloqan's fall to just two Mi-17 medium-lift transport choppers. With six choppers back in the air including some new purchases from Russia, Massoud shifted earlier this year to a strategy of active defense. That meant reinforcing his defense lines in the embattled north-east while at the same time using helicopter resupply to rekindle pockets of guerrilla resistance to the Taliban in the center, north and west of the country.

By late summer the strategy was clearly working. Taliban offensives against northeastern frontlines north of the Hindu Kush range achieved little more than high casualties. At the same time by July and August guerrilla offensives by UF commanders in the west and central and western provinces of Ghor and Herat were serving to divert and tie-down growing numbers of thinstretched Taliban forces.

The Last Lion

Catastrophe struck the United Front on 9 September when two Arab suicide bombers disguised as journalists succeeded in gaining access to Massoud at his Khwaja Bahauddin headquarters near the Tajikistan border and fatally wounding him during an interview. North Africans based in Europe, the two were almost certainly linked directly to al-Qaeda and bin Laden's attempt to gain control of all Afghanistan, The assassination robbed the UF of an irreplaceable leader of immense charisma who had combined the skills and vision of both a warrior and a politician. It also robbed Afghanistan of a hero who as a moderate and tolerant Muslim had for over two decades resisted foreign attempts to dominate his country first those of the Soviet Union, and then from Pakistan as Islambad's military attempted to win commanding influence in Afghanistan by imposing its candidate the extremist and obscurantist Taliban movement, born in Pakistani religious colleges on the country.

No surprise was that the Taliban immediately swung onto the offensive north of Kabul even as Massoud's closest associates tried - with some success - to keep the news of his death from reaching his troops. The "Lion of Panjshir" died within an hour of the explosion on 9 September but he was declared to have been only wounded and his passing was not officially announced until 14 September. But what really pulled the United Front back from the precipice were the events in New York and Washington on 11 September that stunned the world and set the might of U.S. military power on collision course with al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts.

Finally, and at appalling cost, America and the world had woken up to what Massoud and UF leaders had been arguing for years: the close, fiveyear-old alliance between the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Pakistan's military intelligence apparatus was a threat not merely to Afghanistan and its long-suffering people, but to the civilized world.

With the Taliban now pushed dra-



UF re-engineering job: a BMP-1 converted to carry the ever-popular ZU-23 twin cannon instead of the old 73mm smooth bore. The ZU-23 is far more effective in an anti-personnel role.

matically on the defensive by the threat and then the reality of U.S. attack, the United Front found itself abruptly in a position to move onto the attack. It stood to offer the U.S. assistance in three potentially crucial areas — intelligence, a degree of operational support to special force units and, not least, proximity to Kabul in the likely event of a collapse of Taliban power.

But arriving from neighboring Tajikistan in early October after a three-month absence I could see clearly enough that serious UF manpower and logistics problems were going to hinder any swift push on Kabul that was not supported by U.S. air power. All up, the UF probably fields today up to 20,000 armed effectives, of which around 12,000-15,000 are committed to the defensive of the northeastern base area on two key fronts while the rest are operating in guerrilla pockets in the northern, central and western



Twin 81mm mortars mounted on back of a flat-bed truck for mobility and a quick getaway.

regions. In the northeastern is that north of the Hindu Kush running south from the Tajikistan border along the line of the Kokcha River. The second is the front that bisects the Shomali plain north of Kabul.

The immediate problem faced by the UF was that the bulk of its northeastern forces were concentrated on the northern front along the Kokcha - from which the Taliban threat had been greatest - not north of Kabul where the Taliban had been repeatedly bloodied and repulsed. By mid-October on the front north of Kabul only some 4,000 troops were assembled - while across the lines U.S. bombing of Kabul had had the effect of driving Taliban and terrorist forces out of the city to reinforce those on the front line. UF intel estimates by mid-October were that some 6,000 Taliban and allied trrops were spread across the front north of the city, including at least 800 Pakistanis and 600 Arabs. Other reports had Arab militants reinforcing basement bunkers in Kabul's residential quarter of Wazir Akbar Khan awaiting a battle for control of the city - a prospect that promised potentially high casualties among any UF force attempting to move in.

Lifelines

On top of insufficient manpower on the Kabul front, the UF also confronted a major logistics headache. The bulk of its forces and its major sources of external supply were close to the Tajikistan border north of the towering Hindu Kush range. But overnight the most critical front, demanding more troops and

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Editor's note: As we go to press, U.S. forces are beginning to shift the focus of the bombing campaign from Taliban infrastructure to its front line combat resources. Consequently, it is quite possible that much of what this feature describes, may simply no longer exist when this issue reaches our readers hands. It is significant, however, on two points. One: SOF has been there and developed an extensive analysis of the Taliban's combat capability. Secondly, by providing this intelligence summary, readers may better understand the objectives of our current, and future, military operations in the area.

here have been a lot of "experts" on television lately, expounding on the Taliban. Most have never set foot in Afghanistan. Over the past two decades several SOF correspondents and staffers have traveled to Afghanistan and spoke with *mujahideen*, Taliban, and Northern Alliance fighters and observed them fighting on the front lines. Here is SOF's best guess at what the Taliban has to fight with.

Afghanistan's mountains, desert, and plains are home to nearly 27 million people from more than 30 different ethnic groups. The annual per capita gross domestic product is \$800. Average life expectancy for an Afghan male: 47 years; and for a woman: 45 years. Adult literacy is only 32%. There is one telephone for every 925 people. Afghanistan, which is about the size of Texas, has only 1,700 miles of paved road (and speaking from experience most of that is badly potholed and rutted).

The Taliban's power base is the Pahktun or Pushtun people — a Pashto-speaking tribal group numbering about 10 million in Afghanistan (40% of the population) and another 5 million in Pakistan. Many Taliban fighters are from the younger generation that grew up in refugee camps in Pakistan and see the Taliban as the saviors of Afghanistan. The former mujahideen who fought the Russians are all now at least in their 30s or 40s.

The Taliban armed forces are of the mili-

tia type and will not field disciplined, cohesive units prepared to fight conventionally. Command is essentially decentralized, with local commanders, usually a local *mullah* or malik, making their own tactical decisions. They operate as independent elements organized according to the clan principle. The Taliban are not concentrating large numbers of soldiers anywhere for fear that they will be targeted and decimated by U.S. air attacks.

Troop Strength And Organization

As we go to press, the Taliban can supposedly field 45,000 to 50,000 armed men while other estimates maintain that only 12,000 to 18,000 men are fit to fight. The numbers of Taliban combat troops remain guesses at best. Some analysts believe that attacking forces could encounter more than three million guerrilla fighters. Reports from refugees who have fled Afghanistan indicate the Taliban are press-ganging military-age men.

Additional forces may come from non-Taliban tribal militias. According to British Royal Army Major Charles Heyman, editor of *Jane's World Armies*, "There are all sorts of clans who will join for a bit and then move off again and go cold on them, and then come back in the fold." The Soviets had some success in buying off tribal groups and units of local mujahideen.

One can't be sure of current Taliban strengths. Even if it is the lowest number readily available for the fight, the possibility of volunteers from tribal militias and terror-

Soviet tank now in service with Taliban, prepares to fire on Masood's forces. Tanks are more frequently used as self-propelled artillery or cannibalized.

dis-Order **Of Battle** Sof Examines The Taliban War Machine

TEXT & PHOTOS BY ROB KROTT

View of Bagram through sights of a DShK 12.7mm heavy machine gun. Many of these heavier weapons are aging and harsh field use is showing.



ist organizations in Pakistan joining the Taliban is also very real. As many as 60,000 Pakistani students, three-quarters of them from *madrassas* (religious schools) have recently fought in Afghanistan for the Taliban.

Tactics and Training

The Taliban are basically a militia/guerrilla force with limited tactical flexibility. Collective (unit) and individual training is nearly non-existent. Taliban recruits receive basic training on weapons and very little else of military value. Their overall standard of marksmanship is low due to: 1) lack of training; 2) lack of practice ammunition; and 3) an arrogant cultural trait — they believe they're great natural marksmen.

From videos of his training camps it appears tactics focus on small-unit (squad) tactics, terrorist and guerrilla skills, and urban-warfare drills. Thousands of Taliban may have undergone some type of this training. Although it wouldn't make them as well-trained as the infantry and special operations soldiers of Western nations, it has probably increased personal morale and unit cohesion.

Training of company-size forces is very limited and probably only achieved at the whim of the unit commander. Training and formation of battalion-sized conventional infantry units is believed to be non-existent. Lack of equipment and trained personnel precludes any formation of armor units. When U.S. forces become involved in ground-combat operations in Afghanistan they should not underestimate the Taliban's tenaciousness at the small unit level, especially their guerrilla warfare tactics and capabilities. An examination of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is all that is required to prove this point. Comparatively speaking, some Taliban units may be better trained than Afghan forces in the past. For several years now, bin Laden's organization has trained Taliban soldiers and terrorists of many different groups.

Armament Proliferation

The Taliban have been unable to purchase arms legally, due to a UN arms embargo. But prior to 1991 the country was flooded with military equipment and arms. The Soviet-Afghan War served as a testing ground for a wide array of Soviet weaponry, including the BTR-80 and BMP-2 armed vehicles, AGS-17 grenade launcher, Vasilek 82mm automatic mortar, 9P140 Uragan multiple rocket launcher, several models of the Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship, and the Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft. During the Soviet involvement/occupation the Soviet Union equipped Afghanistan with \$5.7 billion worth of arms while the United States underwrote the mujahideen to the tune of \$5 billion during roughly the same period.

Most equipment is of former Soviet origin. When the Soviets pulled out, their records indicated that the Afghan government forces equipment inventory included 1,568 tanks, 828 infantry fighting vehicles, more than 4,880 artillery pieces, 126 combat aircraft and 14 combat helicopters, 12 R-300 (Scud) missile launchers and 10 Luna-M (Frog) missile launchers.



Taliban fighter. When U.S. forces become involved in ground-combat operations in Afghanistan they should not underestimate the Taliban's tenaciousness at the smallunit level, especially their guerrilla warfare tactics and capabilities.

Chinese equipment was supplied to the mujahideen during the 1980s as U.S. aid via Pakistan. Russian estimates (1991) of mujahideen capabilities indicated 200,000 active guerrillas, 97 tanks, 60 BMPs, 100 APCs, over 5,000 anti-aircraft heavy machine guns, 3,500 mortars 2,000 recoilless rifles, and over 11,000 antitank weapons (RPGs). Some of these arms eventually became Taliban property, some was retained by independent groups after the Soviet withdrawal, and some stocks were kept by the retreating government army after the Taliban captured Kabul. More recently supplies have come from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Small Arms And Combat Equipment

The average Taliban fighter is lightly equipped by Western standards. Besides the Kalashnikov assault rifle, which is the standard infantry weapon on both sides, there is no standardization of combat equipment. Taliban small arms include nearly everything in the pre-1990 Soviet armory. Of course the most common weapon is the Kalashnikov. Large stocks of these weapons were left behind by the Soviets and the DRA Army was equipped with them as well. The U.S.supplied Chinese-made AKMs (Type 56 rifle) to the mujahideen and the Taliban has received military aid from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the form of money and weapons shipments, mostly Chinese-made arms.

Large quantities of Soviet PPSh-41 submachine guns were dumped on the pro-government militias by the Soviets. Although a distant second choice to the Kalashnikov they can be found all over Afghanistan and could be used by militia forces and guerrillas. Limited numbers of the Soviet AK-74 firing the smaller caliber 5.45x39mm cartridge are found. The AKR, or short-barreled AKSU versions of the Kalashnikov, are extremely popular (and probably more so now that bin Laden is always seen with one). The AKS-74U 5.45mm paratrooper carbine is closer to a submachine gun than a rifle. Good for close in work, it's not the best weapon for the long-range fighting found in Afghanistan's mountains and plains.

Although significant numbers of the AK-74, including those mounting the BG-15 40mm grenade launcher, were fielded in Afghanistan by Soviet troops before the withdrawal, ammunition supply is not reliable. Copies of the weapon and its ammunition are produced by Pakistan's cottage weapons industry although specimens I examined were marked as .222 caliber. Dozens of shops in Peshawar, Darrah, and Sahakot sell automatic weapons. Current costs are \$83 for a new, locally made AK-47/AKM copy; \$50 for a used one; \$250 for a used Chinese version; and \$300 for an authentic Russianmade Kalashnikov. All manner of submachine guns, bolt-action rifles, revolvers, and semi-automatic handguns are available (see "Guns of the Other Frontier," January 2000 SOF).

Machineguns And Anti-tank Weapons

The RPD, RPK, and PKM light and general-purpose machineguns are com-

monly found throughout Afghanistan. The DShK 12.7mm and KPV 14.5mm (known in Afghanistan as "Dashika" and "Ziqriat") heavy machineguns are in widespread use. Many of these heavier weapons are aging and harsh field use is showing. Barrels are worn on many machineguns. Given a protracted ground campaign without re-supply or replacement, these weapons will eventually succumb to the rigors of Afghan warfare.

AGS-17 30mm automatic A grenade launcher — a fearsome A weapon for ground combat — can be found but their use would depend upon the availability of spare parts and adequate stocks of ammunition as these weapons, first fielded in Afghanistan, are over ten years old. RPG-7s are prevalent and a favored Taliban weapon supplied from Soviet, Chinese, and Pakistani sources.

Volley-fire against armor vehicles or even helicopters can be expected. It is rumored that bin Laden sent specially trained teams to Mogadishu to assist Aideed's forces in shooting down American helicopters using this technique.

More effective for anti-tank use (especially versus Western armor) would be recoilless rifles. I had an opportunity to examine examples of recoilless rifles in use by Taliban troops. The SPG-9 75mm anti-tank gun and the obsolete B-10 (RG82) 82mm anti-tank gun that it replaced are the most common. While these weapons were serviceable, mounts were improvised, sights were damaged, and ammunition supplies were limited. How widespread this situation is can only be guessed at.

Mortars, Artillery, And Rocket Launchers

The only mortars I saw were 82mm M-1937 Soviet mortars. Other Soviet and Chinese produced mortars are certainly in the Taliban inventory. I saw a few D-30 122-mm Towed Howitzers with their unique three-trail carriage. A truck (Ural-375 or ZIL-131) or armored tractor is needed to tow it. One of the guns I saw sat in the open, without a transporter, crew, or ammunition. This is the most common type of artillery available to the Taliban. Unless the Taliban has recently organized and safeguarded these weapons, they exist only as solitary weapons pieced out to various commanders.

The M-46 130-mm Towed Field Gun may pose a threat as at least two chem-



After prayers, Taliban prepare to fire recoilless rifles and heavy machine guns.

ical projectiles have been fielded for this weapon. The 130 mm Sarin projectile weighs 33.4 kg of which 1.6 kg comprises the Sarin CW agent that is dispersed by a TNT bursting charge. The other is a VX projectile weighing 33.4 kg of which 1.4 kg is the VX CW agent. It can't be confirmed whether the Taliban have access to any of these munitions.

The D-20 152-mm Towed Gun-Howitzer fires the following case-type, variable-charge, separate loading ammunition: FRAG-HE, CP, AP-T. Other types of ammunition include chemical, HE/RAP (range of 24000 m), HEAT, illuminating (S-540), smoke (D-540) and tactical nuclear (0.2 kT). The same types of chemical munitions used in the M-46 are available for the D-20.

Rocket Launchers: the BM-21 122mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (40round), the BM-27 9P144 Uragan (Hurricane) 220-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (16 launching barrels firing range of up to 40 km) and the 9A52 300-mm Smerch Multiple Rocket Launcher are all used by the Taliban. Their disposition is the same as the Taliban artillery.

Wheeled Vehicles

Quickly impressed by the crosscountry performance and versatility of Japanese pickup trucks in the war against the Soviets (nicknamed Ahu —



Author, in Taliban bunker, grimaces at sound of incoming artillery.

the deer, pickup trucks were widely used in mujahideen operations in Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, and Nimroz provinces), the Taliban favor pickup trucks as an all-purpose vehicle for both combat and combat-support roles. Equipped with large numbers of Toyota Hilux 4-door pickup trucks purchased in Dubai by Osama bin Laden, the Taliban militia operates as motorized light infantry (or pickup truck cavalry) armed with machineguns, mortars, recoilless rifles, and light multiple rocket launchers (MRLs).

With this mobility the Taliban respond quickly to offensive military action. Equipped with heavy machineguns and handheld RPGs which can be fired on the move, it is the Taliban's principle troop carrier.

Armored Vehicles

Although estimates differ, Taliban armor amounts to about 100 obsolete and poorly maintained Soviet T-54, T-55, and T-62 tanks (and possibly a few T-72s), about 200 armored fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, such as BMDs, BMPs, and BTRs, plus artillery pieces. Most tanks are used as mobile artillery. The only instance I saw of a Taliban tank firing on Northern Alliance forces was done as self-propelled artillery.

It is doubtful if many of their vehicles are sustainable for long-term combat operations. The Taliban has had little, if any, success in procuring spare parts for these old tanks. Major repair parts are only available through cannibalization.

Air Force And Air Defense Weapons

The Afghan Air Force ceased to exist long ago. Remnants of the communist regime's air force have changed hands during the subsequent civil war. It once included 12 combat aircraft squadrons totaling 126 Mig-21, Su-7, Su-20, Su-22, and Il-39 aircraft; five aviation transport squadrons (about 60 An-12, An-26, An-32, and Yak-40 aircraft); and nine combat and transport helicopter squadrons of about 100 Mi-8, Mi-17, and Mi-24 helicopters. The air force operated five major air bases around the country. Some of the An-12 transports were equipped with Sovietdesigned bomb dispensing mechanisms allowing each to carry up to 38 250kilogram bombs.

Most of the surviving aircraft

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BY HARTLY WHITWORTH

Downing Street Tallies Osama and the Taliban

he strict rules of admissibility in English jurisprudence often prevent intelligence information from being used in a court of law. Thus the following information released by Her Majesty's Government of what they know of bin Laden, the Taliban *et al.* did not comprise what they could "prove," rather that which was germane and demonstrable fact. Obviously, known facts that could compromise HMG's sources were not included. Even within these constraints, however, the paper released by Downing Street represents damning information, should anyone actually still harbor doubts about Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and what they have done, and wish to do if they are not stopped.

EVIDENCE OF

As noted in the original paper, "on the basis of all the information available HMG is confident of its conclusions as expressed in this document." Information for that document was drawn from intelligence sources, from criminal investigations and indictments. In this article we shall recite the facts as disclosed by Downing Street, altering only sequence and format for clarity and editing for brevity.

In 1989 Osama bin Laden, and others, founded an international terrorist group known as "al-Qaida" (the Base). At all times he has been the leader of al-Qaida. From 1989 until 1991, Osama bin Laden was based in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. In 1991 he moved to Sudan, where he stayed until 1996. In that year he returned to Afghanistan, where he remains.

The Taliban emerged from the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan in the early 1990s, and by 1996 they had captured Kabul. Led by Mullah Omar, they are still engaged in a bloody civil war to control all Afghanistan. When in 1996 Osama bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan, he established a close relationship with Mullah Omar, and threw his support behind the Taliban. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban regime have a close, symbiotic alliance on which both depend for their continued existence: They also share the same religious values and vision.

Bin Laden has provided the Taliban regime with troops, arms, and money to fight the Northern Alliance. He is closely involved with Taliban military training, planning and operations. He has representatives in Taliban military command structure. He has also given infrastructure assistance and humanitarian aid. Forces under his control have fought alongside the Taliban in the civil war in Afghanistan.

In turn, Omar has provided bin Laden with a safe haven in which to operate, and has allowed him to establish terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. They jointly exploit the Afghan drugs trade. In return for active al-Qaida support, the Taliban allow al-Qaida to operate freely, including planning, training and preparing for terrorist activity. In addition the Taliban provide security for the stockpiles of drugs.

Since 1996, when the Taliban captured Kabul, the United States has consistently raised a whole range of issues, including humanitarian aid and terrorism. Well before 11 September 2001, they had provided evidence to the Taleian of the responsibility of al-Qaida for the terrorist attacks in East Africa. This evidence had been provided to senior leaders of the Talban at their request. The United States government had made it clear to the Taliban regime that al-Qaida had murdered U.S. citizens, and planned to murder more. The U.S. offered to work with the Taliban to expel the terrorists from Afghanistan.

These talks, continuing since 1996, failed to produce any results.

The Aims Of Al-Qaida

Al-Qaida is dedicated to opposing "un-Islamic" governments in Muslim countries with force and violence. Al-Qaida virulently opposes the United States. Osama bin Laden has urged and incited his followers to kill American citizens, in the most unequivocal terms: On 12 October 1996 he issued a declaration of jihad, The people of Islam have suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed by the Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators ... It is the duty now on every tribe in the Arabian peninsula to fight jihad and cleanse the land from these Crusader occupiers. Their wealth is booty to those who kill them. My Muslim brothers: your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places [i.e. Saudi Arabia] are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy — the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can to expel the enemies out of the sanctities [sic] of Islam.

Later in the same year he said that "terrorizing the American occupiers [of Islamic Holy Places] is a religious and logical obligation." In February 1998, he issued and signed a *fatwa* which included a decree to all Muslims: "... the killing of Americans and their civilian and military allies is a religious duty for each and every Muslim to be carried out in whichever country they are until Al Aqsa mosque has been liberated from their grasp and until their armies have left Muslim lands." In the same fatwa he called on Muslim scholars and their leaders and their youth to

"launch an attack on the American soldiers of Satan." He concluded: "We - with God's help - call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill Americans and plunder their money whenever and wherever they find it. We also call on Muslim[s] ... to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them."

When asked, in 1998, about obtaining chemical or nuclear weapons he said

"acquiring such weapons for the defense of Muslims [was] a religious duty." From the early 1990s Osama bin Laden has sought to obtain nuclear and chemical materials for use as weapons of terror.

In an interview aired on *Al Jazira* (Doha, Qatar) television he stated: "Our enemy is every American male, whether he is directly fighting us or paying taxes." In two interviews broadcast on U.S. television in 1997 and 1998 he referred to the terrorists who carried out the earlier attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 as "role models." He went on to exhort his followers "to take the fighting to America."

Although U.S. targets are al-Qaida's priority, it also explicitly threatens United States' allies. References to "Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators," and to "Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them" are references which unquestionably include the United Kingdom.

On-Going Plans

There is a continuing threat. Based on our experience of the way the network has operated in the past, other cells, like those that carried out the terrorist attacks on 11 September, must be assumed to exist. Al-Qaida functions both on its own and through a network of other terrorist organizations.

These include Egyptian Islamic Jihad and other North-

African Islamic extremist terrorist groups, and a number of other jihad groups in countries including Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan and India. Al-Qaida also maintains cells and personnel in many other countries to facilitate its activities.

Osama bin Laden heads the al-Qaida network, and below him is a body known as the Shura, which includes representatives of other terrorist groups, such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman Zawahiri and prominent lieutenants of bin Laden such as Abu Hafs Al-Masri. Egyptian Islamic Jihad has, in effect, merged with al-Qaida.

In addition to the Shura, al-Qaida has several groups dealing with military, media, financial and Islamic issues. Mohamed Atef is a member of the group that deals with military and terrorist operations: His duties include princi-

> pal responsibility for training al-Qaida members. Members of al-Qaida must make a pledge of allegiance to follow the orders of Osama bin Laden.

A great deal of evidence about Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida has been made available in the U.S. indictment for earlier crimes. Since 1989, Osama bin Laden has conducted substantial financial and business transactions on behalf of al-Qaida and in pursuit of its goals. These include purchasing land for training camps, purchasing warehouses for the storage of items, including

storage of items, including explosives, purchasing communications and electronics equipment, and transporting currency and weapons to members of al-Qaida and associated terrorist groups in countries throughout the world.

Since 1989 Osama bin Laden has provided training camps and guesthouses in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya for the use of al-Qaida and associated terrorist groups. We know from intelligence that there are currently at least a dozen camps across Afghanistan, of which at least four are used for training terrorists. Since 1989, Osama bin Laden has established a series of businesses to fund al-Qaida, and provide cover for procuring explosives, weapons and chemicals, and the travel of al-Qada operatives.

The businesses have included a holding company known as "Wadi Al Aqiq," a construction business known as "Al Hijra," an agricultural business known as "Al Themar Al Mubaraka," and investment companies known as "Ladin International" and "Taba Investments."

Osama Bin Laden And Previous Attacks

In 1992 and 1993, Mohamed Atef traveled to Somalia on several occasions for the purpose of organizing violence against United States and United Nations troops then stationed in Somalia. On each occasion he reported back to Osama bin Laden, at his base in the Riyadh district of Khartoum. In the spring of 1993 Atef, Saif al Adel, another



senior member of al-Qaida, and other members began to provide military training to Somali tribes for the purpose of fighting the United Nations forces.

On 3 and 4 October 1993 operatives of al-Qaida participated in the attack on U.S. military personnel serving in Somalia as part of the operation 'Restore Hope'. Eighteen U.S. military personnel and an estimated 500 Somalis were killed in the attack.

From 1993 members of al-Qaida began to live in Nairobi and set up businesses there, including Asma Ltd., and Tanzanite King. They were regularly visited there by senior members of al-Qaida, in particular by Atef and Abu Ubadiah al Banshiri. Beginning in the latter part of 1993, members of al-Qaida in Kenya began to discuss the possibility of attacking the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi in retaliation for U.S. participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

Ali Mohamed, a U.S. citizen and admitted member of al-Qaida, surveyed the U.S. Embassy as a possible target for a terrorist attack. He took photographs and made sketches, which he presented to Osama bin Laden while bin Laden was in Sudan. He also admitted that he had trained terrorists for al-Qaida in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, and that those whom he trained included many involved in the East African bombings in August 1998.

In June or July 1998, two al-Qaida operatives, Fahid Mohammed Ali Msalam and Sheik Ahmed Salim Swedan, purchased a Toyota truck and made various alterations. In early August 1998, operatives of al-Qaida gathered Nairobi to execute the bombing of the U.S. Embassy.

On 7 August 1998, Assam, a Saudi national and al-Qaida operative, drove the truck to the U.S. embassy, with a large bomb in the back. Also in the truck was Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al 'Owali, another Saudi. (He, by his own confession, was an al-Qaida operative, who from about 1996 had been trained in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan in explosives, hijacking, kidnapping, assassination and intelligence techniques. With Osama bin Laden's express permission, he fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. He had met Osama bin Laden personally in 1996 and asked for another "mission." Osama bin Laden sent him to East Africa after extensive specialized training at camps in Afghanistan.)

As the truck approached the Embassy, Al 'Owali got out and threw a stun grenade at a security guard. Assam drove the truck up to the rear of the embassy. He got out and then detonated the bomb, which demolished a multi-story secretarial college and severely damaged the U.S. embassy, and the Co-operative bank building. The bomb killed 213 people, including Assam, and injured 4500.

Al 'Owali expected the mission to end in his death, he had been willing to die for al-Qaida, but at the last minute he ran away from the bomb truck and survived. He had no money, passport or plan to escape after the mission. After a few days, he called a number in Yemen to have money transferred to him in Kenya. The number he rang in Yemen was contacted by Osama bin Laden's phone on the same day.

Another person arrested in connection with the Nairobi bombing was Mohamed Sadeek Odeh. He admitted to his involvement. He identified the principal participants in the bombing. He named three other persons, all of whom were al-Qaida or Egyptian Islamic Jihad members.

In Dar es Salaam the same day, at about the same time,

operatives of al-Qaida detonated a bomb at the U.S. embassy, killing 11. The al-Qaida operatives involved included Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil and Khaflan Khamis Mohamed. The bomb was carried in a Nissan Atlas truck, which Ahmed Khfaklan Ghailani and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, two al-Qaida operatives, had purchased in July 1998, in Dar es Salaam.

When Khaflan Khamis Mohamed was arrested for the bombing, He admitted membership of al-Qaida, and implicated other members of al-Qaida in the bombing.

On 7 and 8 August 1998, two other members of al-Qaida disseminated claims of responsibility for the two bombings by faxing the media in Paris, Doha in Qatar, and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. Additional evidence of the involvement of al-Qaida in the East African bombings came from a search conducted in London of several residences and businesses belonging to al-Qaida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad members. In those searches a number of documents were found including claims of responsibility for the East African bombings in the name of a fictitious group, "the Islamic Army for the liberation of the Holy Places."

Al 'Owali, the would-be suicide bomber, admitted he was told to make a videotape of himself using the name of the same fictitious group. The faxed claims of responsibility were traced to a telephone number, which had been in contact with Osama bin Laden's cell phone. The claims disseminated to the press were clearly written by someone familiar with the conspiracy. They stated that the bombings had been carried out by two Saudis in Kenya, and one Egyptian in Dar es Salaam. They were probably sent before the bombings had even taken place, as they referred to two Saudis dying in the Nairobi attack. In fact, because Al 'Owali fled at the last minute, only one Saudi died.

On 22 December 1998 Osama bin Laden was asked by *Time* magazine whether he was responsible for the August 1998 attacks. He replied: "The International Islamic Jihad Front for the jihad against the U.S. and Israel has, by the grace of God, issued a crystal clear fatwa calling on the Islamic nation to carry on Jihad aimed at liberating the holy sites. The nation of Mohammed has responded to this appeal. If instigation for jihad against the Jews and the Americans ... is considered to be a crime, then let history be a witness that I am a criminal. Our job is to instigate and, by the grace of God, we did that, and certain people responded to this instigation."

He was asked if he knew the attackers: "... those who risked their lives to earn the pleasure of God are real men. They managed to rid the Islamic nation of disgrace. We hold them in the highest esteem." And what the U.S. could expect of him: "... any thief or criminal who enters another country to steal should expect to be exposed to murder at any time The U.S. knows that I have attacked it, by the grace of God, for more than ten years now

"God knows that we have been pleased by the killing of American soldiers [in Somalia in 1993]. This was achieved by the grace of God and the efforts of the mujahideen Hostility towards America is a religious duty and we hope to be rewarded for it by God. I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America."

In December 1999 a terrorist cell linked to al-Qaida was discovered trying to carry out attacks inside the United States. An Algerian, Ahmed Ressam, was stopped at the U.S.-Canadian border and over 100 pounds of bomb-making material was found in his car. Ressam admitted he was planning to set off a large bomb at Los Angeles International airport on New Year's Day. He said that he had received terrorist training at al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan and then been instructed to go abroad and kill U.S. civilians and military personnel.

On 3 January 2000, a group of al-Qaida members, and other terrorists who had trained in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan, attempted to attack a U.S. destroyer with a

small boat loaded with explosives. Their boat sank, aborting the attack.

On 12 October 2000, however, the U.S.S. Cole was struck by an explosiveladen boat while refuelling in Aden harbour. Seventeen crew were killed, and 40 injured. Several of the perpetrators of the Cole attack Yemenis and (mostly Saudis) were trained at Osama bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan. Al 'Owali has identified the two commanders of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole as having partic-



This image released 5 January 2001 shows U.S. Navy and Marine Corps security personnel patrolling past damaged U.S. Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole 18 October 2000 following 12 October 2000 terrorist bombing attack on ship in Aden, Yemen.

ipated in the planning and preparation for the East African embassy bombings.

In the months before the September 11 attacks, propaganda videos were distributed throughout the Middle East and Muslim world by al-Qaida, in which Osama bin Laden and others were shown encouraging Muslims to attack American and Jewish targets. Similar videos, extolling violence against the U.S. and other targets, were distributed before the East African embassy attacks in August 1998.

Osama Bin Laden And The 11 September Attacks

Nineteen men have been identified as the hijackers from the passenger lists of the four planes hijacked on 11 September 2001. At least three of them have already been positively identified as associates of al-Qaida. One has been identified as playing key roles in both the East African embassy attacks and the U.S.S. Cole attack.

From intelligence sources, the following facts have been established subsequent to 11 September; for intelligence reasons, the names of associates, though known, are not given:

• In the run-up to 11 September, bin Laden was mounting a concerted propaganda campaign among like-minded groups of people — including videos and documentation — justifying attacks on Jewish and American targets; and claiming that those who died in the course of them were carrying out God's work.

• We have learned, subsequent to 11 September, that bin Laden himself asserted shortly before 11 September that he was preparing a major attack on America.

• In August and early September close associates of bin Laden were warned to return to Afghanistan from other parts of the world by 10 September.

Immediately prior to 11 September some known

associates of bin Laden were naming the date for action as on or around 11 September.

• Since 11 September we have learned that one of bin Laden's closest and most senior associates was responsible for the detailed planning of the attacks.

• There is evidence of a very specific nature relating to the guilt of bin Laden and his associates that is too sensitive to release.

Osama bin Laden remains in charge, and the mastermind, of al-Qaida. In al-Qaida, an operation the scale of the 11 September attacks would have been approved by Osama bin

Laden himself. The modus operandi of 11 Sep-tember was entirely consistent with previous attacks. Al Qaida's record of atrocities is characterized by meticulous, longterm planning, a desire to inflict mass casualties, suicide bombers, and multiple, simultaneous attacks.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 are entirely consistent with the scale and sophistication of the planning which went into the attacks on the East African Embassies and the U.S.S. Cole. No warnings were

given for these three attacks, just as there was none on 11 September.

Al-Qaida operatives, in evidence given in the East African Embassy bomb trials, have described how the group spends years preparing for an attack. They conduct repeated surveillance, patiently gather materials, and identify and vet operatives with the skills to participate in the attack and the willingness to die. The operatives involved in the 11 September atrocities attended flight schools, used flight simulators to study the controls of larger aircraft and placed potential airports and routes under surveillance.

Al-Qaida's attacks are characterized by total disregard for innocent lives, including Muslims. In an interview after the East African bombings, Osama bin Laden insisted that the need to attack the United States excused the killing of other innocent civilians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. No other organization has both the motivation and the capability to carry out attacks like those of the 11 September only the al-Qaida network under Osama bin Laden.

Conclusion

The attacks of 11 September 2001 were planned and carried out by al-Qaida, an organization whose head is Osama bin Laden.

That organization has the will, and the resources, to execute further attacks of similar scale. Both the United States and its close allies are targets for such attacks.

The attack could not have occurred without the alliance between the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, which allowed bin Laden to operate freely in Afghanistan, promoting, planning and executing terrorist activity.

Hartly Whitworth is a military and technical historian. 🕱

The Bear Went Over The Montain


How Boris Bungled In Afghanistan

BY AL J. VENTER

An enterprising young journalist in London called the Tajikistan information ministry in Dushanbe to find out what media competition he was likely to have after recent events in Afghanistan. "Any Western journalists get there yet?" he inquired. "Yes," said a voice at the other end, "as a matter of fact there are 400 of them that are here." A long pause followed while the scribe tried to hide his dismay. "But not to worry," the voice added, "all but one of them are in hospital with dysentery...."

ometh the moment, cometh the man, goes the homily. Considering what's happening now in Asia, that individual is a burly former Vietnam vet by the name of Lester Grau.

As one of the West's leading authorities on the Soviet Army at war — Lieutenant Colonel Grau, a military analyst at the Foreign Military Studies



at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. — recently published The Bear Went Over the Mountain. His subtitle is Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, which says it all.

Grau's research, presented here in a single volume must be one of the remarkable books of our time. Timely to the extent that it seems preordained, he gives us an unusual and disturbing insight to Soviet tactics (or lack of them) when Russia fought its nine-year war in Afghanistan.

Just about everything that he has to say about that brutal conflict — it eventually played a role in fragmenting the Soviet Union — has as much relevance now as it did when the bear went storming into this immense and stark terrain in December 1979. More important, he explains how the Soviets got it wrong.

In compiling *The Bear* Col. Grau worked directly with the people at Russia's prestigious Frunza Institute who, at the time, were most intimately involved in the fight against Afghanistan's *Mujahideen*. The lessons that emerged involved the same people who had been at the sharp end when things were at their worst: battalion and company commanders, platoon leaders and even sergeants. They have some powerful lessons to impart.

While Grau was at the Russian academy — a distinguished ground forces command and staff college with chairs of operational-tactical disciplines — he was given access to the intricacies of dozens of operations launched by the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The 48 contacts that he analyzes (each usefully illustrated by a map) exposes factors such as terrain, geography, weapons, tactics, deployment as well as the respective forces involved on both sides. He concludes with a score count of both Soviet and Mujahideen casualties. Each battle ends with a commentary from the Academy and finally, Grau adds his own intrusive and none-too-flattering assessment of the situation. Though Grau worked under the Academy's auspices, he never pulls a punch: The warts and blemishes are all there, which is the book's strongest attribute.

Curiously, this might be one of the reasons why we weren't able to interview the Colonel for a backgrounder. We tried, but following America's declaration of war against terrorism and the deployment of U.S. forces in the region, he has been embargoed by the DoD from speaking to anybody without appropriate clearance.

The reason is simple. Going by this book, there can't be more than a handful of specialists who know as much about the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation and survival in Afghanistan. At the end of it, what emerges, is a single pervading sentence that creeps into just about all the operations covered. It goes something like this: "The enemy slipped away into the mountains."

As he says, the Soviets admit that about 90% of their ambushes were unsuccessful. They made two seminal errors (and the Americans could fall into the same trap); first, of ignoring what happened to the British almost two centuries before in that vast isolated wilderness and, second, events which dictated the course of rebellion by the Basmachi movement. These were resistance fighters in Central Asia who opposed Soviet dominance from 1918 until they were finally subjugated in 1933, with huge loss of life.

Some of the statistics that Grau provides are staggering. Of approximately 620,000 Soviet soldiers who served in a mountainous land — that would easily have swallowed up three or four times number of troops had they been available — 73%, or almost half a million of them ultimately became casualties. In this regard, the *Muj* never had to contemplate the use of biological warfare: Instead, they let nature take its course.

While the number of Soviet troops KIA was a modest 14,000 or so, another 400,000 fell victim to disease in one of the harshest countries in the world. More than 115,000 Russian soldiers contracted infectious hepatitis. Typhoid afflicted 31,000 of them.

What is also interesting is that by the end of 1983 — four years into the war, the Soviets had reported only six of their own troops dead or wounded, tles. The results are fascinating.

He discusses the nature of hostilities in an extremely difficult environment and is able to give us a competent picture of the enemy. Also dealt with in the aftermath of each contact is the kind of intelligence that led up to it, forces deployed, planning, logistics, tactical movement, clandestine work and deception in the field and finally, casualties on both sides.

Then comes something that we haven't had much of before: a detailed analysis of how the Soviets operated on the ground. He offers us their strengths, shortcomings and most salient, some of the mistakes they made. With this wealth of data, Grau's book must be of intrinsic value once our own people decide to go in.

An aspect underscored by *The Bear* is that during the Soviet war, several combat principals lay at the heart of the Mujahideen's tactics.



In this late 1988 photo, Soviet soldiers observe the highlands, while fighting Islamic guerrillas at an undisclosed location in Afghanistan.

even though the Kremlin by then was well aware that the 40th Army had suffered 16,000 casualties (of which 6,262 were fatalities). A sidelight here is that it took the Afghan War for the Soviets to rediscover that slight wounds at high altitude can rapidly turn fatal.

Further, during the course of the war the Soviets lost 118 jets, 333 helicopters (or just more than one a day, when the Stingers were doing their worst in the final stages) 147 tanks all of them MBTs, 1,138 APCs, 433 artillery pieces and mortars, 1,138 radio sets and CP vehicles and a staggering 11,369 trucks. All this must have been an immense drain on a country just then trying to compete industrially and economically with the West.

Step by careful step, Grau walks us through dozens of anti-Mujahideen bat-

First they avoided contact with the superior might of regular forces which could easily have annihilated them. Second, they practically never conducted positional warfare: When threatened with encirclement, they would rather abandon their positions. Third, in all forms of combat, the insurgents always strove to achieve surprise. Fourth, they usefully adapted many of the lessons learnt from what happened to the Basmachis: What emerges is a determination among the Muj not to let that happen again.

Unquestionably, the rebels had intimate knowledge of the terrain, coupled to the fact that they were natural, gifted scouts "and were capable of rapidly transmitting the necessary information about secret Soviet unit or subunit movements over great distances using



Khan Agha, 62, walks with his crutches in a street of the Afghan capital on October 14, 2001. Like hundreds of thousands of other Afghans, Khan lost a leg during the ten years of war against the Russians in the 1980s.

rudimentary communications gear and signaling devices," says Grau. Among the guerrillas tactical strong suits were all types of night actions, the ability rapidly and clandestinely — to move in the mountains and field of a very broad agent reconnaissance network.

What strikes the reader forcibly is an inference that these simple peasant folk weren't as innocent as they would like us to believe. They were able to infiltrate a high level of Soviet security at an early stage of the war. As Grau explains, "operations security is difficult, particularly when fighting on someone else's turf and working with an indigenous force which may not be a hundred percent on your side." Because of this, he quotes, "the enemy intercepted our messages, deciphered them and, in the best cases, avoided our ambushes."

Each time a large-scale Soviet operation involved Afghan government forces, it eventually got to the stage where few if any of the planning or operational details were imparted to their Afghan allies till the last moment. As one Russian officer was hear to mutter after a staff briefing, "the bastards knew what we were going to do even before we'd left camp."

That said, the book is not just another collection of military vignettes. Rather, what Colonel Grau has come up with is a touchstone for any future Afghan military operation. He achieves this by not offering us only his own opinion, but the quotes of the men who were involved right there in the dirt and dust. The picture that emerges is at the same time ugly and bizarre.

Take One Example

On page 171 he covers an ambush conducted by a reinforced reconnaissance platoon northwest of Surubi (which lies about 30 miles east of Kabul on the highway to Jalalabad).

Major I.V. Solonin was the commander of an airborne battalion that had been tasked with interdicting rebel war supplies then coming across the mountains from Pakistan. It was an area in which the Mujahideen were exceptionally active.

Solonin chose his forces carefully. He selected the battalion reconnaissance platoon, an airborne platoon, an engineer squad (for mines) and an AGS-17 crew for the ambush (making it 23 personnel in all). To put his Afghan allies off the scent, he worked in secret under the guise of routine training. The group moved to the ambush site at dusk on the designated day, which wasn't easy since they had to skirt a security position held by their so-called Afghan allies. They didn't need their intentions leaked.

By 0300, the two-tier ambush was in place on the slope of a hill overlooking the path. All escape routes were mined. Deployed, too, was a command-detonated mine (the Soviet version of the Claymore). A 'snatch group' occupied the first tier while a support section was positioned about 50 yards above that. Radio comms with HQ were constant: Solonin wanted to know at all times what his men were doing.

Nothing happened the first night and the unit stayed in place and out of sight all of the following day.

Just before midnight on the second night, a lone figure approached from the village of Jegdaley (see map). He was obviously doing a recce for the main group and they let him pass. Three hours later an armed group of 11 rebels came directly towards the ambush and after a short intense fight five were killed and six captured. The attackers suffered no casualties.

In the Frunze commentary (which appears directly below each battle report) the point made was that because of casualties over a period of time when smaller groups were deployed and overrun — at least 25 men were to be involved in any Afghan ambush and regulations stated that it should include heavy crew-served weapons. This time an exception was made, mainly because the difficult, mountainous terrain. It



The mother of a soldier killed while on active duty weeps as she attends a special remembrance service in the Church of All Saints in Moscow, 23 February 2000, as across the nation Russians mark Fatherland Defender's Day.

would have been difficult to move quickly with items such as the 12.7mm Dshka heavy machine gun which even without tripod and ammo weighs 75 pounds. Similarly, an AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher tops the scale at 32 pounds.

Dismounted Soviet soldiers were noticeably less agile than Afghan rebels and in open terrain could hardly ever catch up with them.

Something else that emerges is that in some of the sweeps that took place later in the war, operational sweeps in inhabited areas would often result in young men being apprehended and drafted on the spot into the Afghan Army.

One aspect that comes through a lot is that the Soviets weren't able to use their artillery effectively when they most needed it.

Take the case of an ambush northwest of Jalalabad, late 1986. A huge caravan carrying all sorts of war materiel had moved into Afghanistan from Pakistan and was being targeted. Since it was almost a mile long, this was an important target. Though several strikes were made after fire commenced and the Soviet troops had some success, one of the criticisms that came out afterwards was that five to seven minutes passed from the time that the company commander radioed his artillery to open fire and the actual start of their firing. Obviously, the enemy had all the time they needed to escape.

Dealing with this almost culpable lapse in his summary, Grau says that "poor artillery adjustment by companygrade officers is a constant theme in this book. They solved the problem by putting forward observers (FO) down to company and platoon level," which, he adds, "suggests a training deficiency for what should have been a universal skill for professionals."

He also states that the Soviet emphasis on massed firepower instead of accuracy meant that the Soviet soldier, once dismounted from his armored vehicle carried a lot more ammunition than his Western counterpart.

Notably, though SPETSNAZ troops played a critical role in the war, very little about these elite soldiers appears in *The Bear*, though he does mention that as hostilities progressed, material support brigades and battalions were formed to provide more effective support for combat units.

"Airborne, air assault and SPET-SNAZ forces were refitted with roomier

BTRs and BMPs instead of their usual BMDs ... and forces were upgraded with extra machine guns, AGS-17s and mortars."

Since the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan, there have been many questions asked about how it was that the mighty Soviet Union with its formidable military machine and incomparable planning and intelligence network could have fallen into the Afghan trap? The answer is revealed piecemeal in the many battles that Colonel Grau dissects. You also get some of it from the candid comments made by Frunze specialists afterwards.

What the book does best is to offer the reader a revealing portrait of this war in general, tactics in particular and coincidentally, the soldiers' human condition. Interestingly and by inference, it

also discloses that the West's intelligence's picture of how the Soviets operated tactically lagged 10 years behind reality: an indictment of our own system which is supposed to be tops.


Though Afghanistan has been called the Soviet Union's Vietnam, this analogy is not really warranted. Look at the figures:

In Vietnam U.S. military strength rose to over 500,000 troops and the Americans resorted to many divisional and multi-divisional operations. By comparison, in Afghanistan — a region five times the size of Vietnam — Soviet strength varied from 90,000 to 104,000 troops. The Soviet's five divisions, four separate brigades and four separate regiments and smaller support units of the 40th Army strained to provide security for the 21 provincial centers and few industrial and economic installations. They were also seriously hard pressed to extend this security to the thousands of villages, hundreds of miles of communications routes and key terrain features that punctuated and spanned that vast region.

Remember, too, that at that time Afghanistan's population was somewhere in the region of about 20 million.

Grau makes several other observations. One of these is that Soviet and Afghan government forces did little to contest the rebel ownership of the night.

"Night patrols and ambushes were a singular planned event and not a routine mission. Battalions and companies moved into their bunkers after dark for protection from Mujahideen mortar



and rocket attacks," he states.

As he says, drawing on his own experiences in Vietnam, the Americans put out ambushes every night on likely trails where intelligence reports indicated enemy activity. "In Afghanistan the Soviets apparently conducted ambushes against specific intelligence and on an irregular basis."

Another is that squadron-sized ambushes were frequently too cumbersome, although using smaller platoons for that purpose was banned by 40th Army regulations because of the fear of being overrun which seemed to happen more often than the Russians like to admit.

Troop strength was an issue throughout the war. Grau concludes that quite often the Soviets couldn't assemble a single regiment for combat and had to cobble together forces from various units to make something makeshift that could be deployed. He goes on, "the Soviet Union failed to maintain adequate personnel strength in its line units. Regiments were often at single battalion strength, battalions at single company strength and companies at single platoon strength. First priority on personnel replacement always went to filling the driver, gunner and vehicle commander slots for the unit combat vehicles. This left few personnel to dismount and fight the resistance."

Though units were filled twice a year from the spring and fall draft call-ups, disease slashed unit capability to fight, invariably caused by bad sanitation practices and poor diet. Consequently,

at any one time, a quarter to a third of a unit's strength would be down with hepatitis, malaria, typhus, amoebic dysentery and meningitis.

"One of the immediate consequences was that few personnel were left to dismount and fight the resistance ... there was also an evident dislike of close combat and a preference for massive amounts of fire power instead," declares Grau in his conclusion.

Notably, he details the development of the Soviet bronegruppa concept; an armored group of four or five tanks, BMPs or BTRs or any combination of such vehicles, usually deployed without their normally assigned motorized rifle squad onboard to fight away from their dismounted troops in difficult terrain.

As he points out, it was a bold step: Commanders of mechanized forces dislike separating their dismounted infantry from their carriers, but terrain often dictated such options. There were times when the bronegruppa concept gave commanders a potent, maneuverable reserve which could attack independently on the flanks, block enemy routes of withdrawal, serve as a mobile fire platform or a battle taxi to pick up forces (which had infiltrated or were dropped early by chopper), perform patrols, provide

Continued on page 78

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BY GEORGE HAVERFORD

For many years, the bulk of the suspects and fugitives on the new

FBI "Most Wanted Terrorists List"have been sought by the Diplomatic Security Service of the U.S. Department of State, with millions of dollars in rewards offered under the DSS Rewards for Justice program. In the wake of the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon, the entire list of terrorists wanted by the Diplomatic Security Service, plus a few more whose offenses fall more directly under the purview of the Department of Justice but not the DSS, have been combined into an FBI "Most Wanted" program, patterned after the very successful "10 Most Wanted Fugitives" initiative administered for decades by the FBI. Rewards up to \$5 million are offered by the U.S. Government, and

in some cases an additional \$2 million is offered through a program funded by the Airline Pilots Association and the Air Transport Association. Rewards are being offered for "information leading directly to the apprehension or conviction" of the subjects. Anyone with relative information should contact their local FBI (phone number is inside front cover of your phone book), or the Rewards for Justice Program at P.O. Box 96781, Washington, D.C. 20090-6781; or call toll-free 1-800-437-6371; outside the United States contact the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate.

In all cases, subjects are wanted for terrorist crimes, and should be considered armed and dangerous.



USAMA BIN LADEN

Wanted for murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Aliases: Usama bin Muhammad bin Ladin, Shaykh Usama bin Ladin, the Prince, the Emir, Abu Abdallah, Mujahid Shaykh, Hajj, the Director.

Born 1957, Saudia Arabia; 6'4" to 6'6", approximately 160 pounds, thin build, brown hair, brown eyes, olive complexion. Speaks Arabic (probably Pashtu). Left-handed, walks with cane. Saudi Arabian citizenship (revoked). Believed to be in Afghanistan.

Wanted in connection with 7 August 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya; is also suspect in other terrorist attacks throughout the world.

AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI



Wanted for murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Aliases: Abu Muhammad, Abu Fatima, Muhammad Ibrahim, Abu Abdallah, Abu al-Mu'iz, The Doctor, The Teacher, Nur, Ustaz, Abu Mohammed, Abu Mohammed Nur al-Deen, Abdel Muaz, Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri.

Born 1951, Egypt; dark brown hair, dark eyes, olive complexion; Speaks Arabic, French. Al-Zawahiri is a physician and founder of Egyptian Islamic Jihad; this organization opposes secular Egyptian government, seeks to overthrow it through violent means. Believed to now serve as advisor and doctor to Usama bin Laden, currently thought to be in Afghanistan.

Has been indicted for his alleged role in the 7 August 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.

ABDELKARIM HUSSEIN MOHAMED AL-NASSER



Wanted for conspiracy to kill U.S. Nationals; conspiracy to kill U.S. employees; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; conspiracy to destroy property of the U.S.; conspiracy to attack national defense utilities; bombing resulting in

death; use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; murder while using weapons of mass destructive device during a crime of violence; murder of federal employees; attempted murder of federal employees.

No known aliases.

Born in Al Ihsa, Saudi Arabia; 5'8", 170 pounds, speaks Arabic (Farsi); black hair, brown eyes, olive complexion; Saudi Arabian citizenship.

Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed Al-Nasser has been indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for the 25 June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH



Wanted for murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on federal facility resulting in death; conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to

destroy the national defense utilities of the United States. Aliases: Abu Mohamed Al-Masri, Saleh, Abu Mariam.

Born 1963 Egypt; 5'8"; medium build, speaks Arabic, dark hair, dark eyes, olive complexion, scar on right side of lower lip, may wear a moustache; Egyptian citizen. Abdujllah fled Nairobi, Kenya on 6 August 1998 and went to Karachi, Pakistan, now currently believed to be in Afghanistan.

Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah has been indicted for his alleged involvement in the 7 August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.

MUHSIN MUSA MATWALLI ATWAH



Wanted for conspiracy to kill United States nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to destroy national defense utilities of the United States.

Namer.

Aliases: Abdul Rahman, Abdul Rahman Al-Muhajir, Abdel Rahman, Mohammed K.A. Al-

Born 19 June 64, Egypt; 5'3" to 5'7", medium build, dark (graying) hair, dark eyes, olive complexion, speaks Arabic; Egyptian citizen; believed to currently be in Afghanistan.

Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah is wanted in connection with the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.

ALI ATWA



Wanted for conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, to commit hostage taking, to commit air piracy resulting in murder, to interfere with a flight crew, to place a destructive device aboard an aircraft, to have explosive devices about the person on an aircraft, and to assault passengers and crew;

air piracy resulting in murder; air piracy; hostage taking; interference with flight crew; and placing explosives aboard aircraft; placing destructive devices aboard aircraft; assault aboard aircraft with intent to hijack with a dangerous weapon and resulting in serious bodily injury; aiding and abetting.

Born approximately 1960, Lebanon; 5'8", 150 pounds, medium build; speaks Arabic; dark hair, brown eyes; Lebanese citizenship; alleged to be member of the terrorist organization Lebanese Hizballah. He is thought to be in Lebanon.

Ali Atwa was indicted for his role and participation in the 14 June 1985 hijacking of a commercial airlines that resulted in the assault on various passengers and crew members, and the murder of one U.S. citizen.



ANAS AL-LIBY

Wanted for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to destroy the national defense utilities of the United States. Aliases: Anas Al-Sabai, Anas Al-Libi, Nazih Al-Raghie, Nahih Abdul Hamed Al-Raghie.

Born 30 March 64, Tripoli Libya; 5"10", medium build, dark hair, dark eyes, olive complexion; speaks Arabic; Libyan citizenship; has scar on left side of face; usually wears a full beard.

Al-Liby recently lived in the United Kingdom, where he has political asylum. He is believed to currently be in Afghanistan.

Anas Al Libby is wanted in connection with 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.

AHMED KHALFAN GHAILANI



Wanted for murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Aliases: Ahmad Khalafan Ghilani, Ahmed Khalfan Ahmed, Abubakar K. Ahmed, Abubakary K. Ahmed, Abubakar Ahmed, Abu Bakr Ahmad, A. Ahmed, Ahmed Khalfan, Ahmed Khalfan Ali, Abubakar Khalfan Ahmed, Ahmed Ghailani, Ahmad Al Tanzani, Abu Khabar, Abu Bakr, Abubakary Khalfan Ahmed Ghailani, Mahafudh Abubakar Ahmed Abdullah Hussein, Shariff Omar Mohammed, "Foopie", "Fupi", "Ahmed the Tanzanian."

Born [variably] 14 March 74, 13 April 74, 14 April 74, 1 August 70, Zanzibar, Tanzania; 5'3" to 5'4", 150 pounds, black hair, brown eyes, dark complexion; speaks Swahili. Tanzanian citizen.

Ahmed Ghailani was indicted in the Southern District of New York on 16 December 1998 for his alleged involvement in the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

HASAN IZZ-AL-DIN



Wanted for conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, to commit hostage taking, to commit air piracy resulting in murder, to interfere with a flight crew, to place a destructive device aboard an aircraft, to have explosive devices about the person on an aircraft, and to assault

passengers and crew; air piracy resulting in murder; air piracy; hostage taking; interference with flight crew; and placing explosives aboard aircraft; placing destructive devices aboard aircraft; assault aboard aircraft with intent to hijack with a dangerous weapon and resulting in serious bodily injury; aiding and abetting.

Aliases: Ahmed Garbaya, Samir Salwwan, Sa-id.

Born 1963, Lebanon; 5'9" to 5'11", 145 to 150 pounds, slender build; speaks Arabic; black hair, black eyes; Lebanese citizenship. Izz-Al-Din is alleged to be a member of the terrorist organization Lebanese Hizballah. He is believed to be in Lebanon.

Hasan Izz-Al-Din was indicted for his role in planning and participation in the 14 June 1985 hijacking of a commercial airliner that resulted in the assault on various passengers and the murder of one U.S. citizen.

AHMED MOHAMMED HAMED ALI



Wanted for conspiracy to kill United States nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to destroy national defense utilities of the United States.

Aliases: Shaib, Abu Islam Al-Surir, Ahmed Ahmed, Ahmed the Egyptian, Ahmed Hemed, Hamed Ali, Ahmed Shieb, Abu Islam, Ahmed Mohammed Ali, Ahmed Hammed, Ahmed Mohammed Abdurehman, Abu Khadiijah, Abu Fatima, Ahmad Al-Masri.

Born 1965, Egypt; 5'6" to 5'8", medium build; Speaks Arabic; dark hair, dark eyes, olive complexion. Egyptian citizen. Ali may have formal training in agriculture and may have worked in this field. He lived in Kenya until fleeing on 2 August 1998 to Karachi, Pakistan. He is believed to currently be in Afghanistan.

Ahmed Mohammed Hamed Ali is wanted in connection with the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.

FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED



Wanted for murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Abdallah Fazul, Abdalla Fazul, Abdallah Mohammed Fazul, Fazul Abdilahi

Mohammed, Fazul Adballah, Fazul Abdallah, Fazul Mohammed, Haroon, Harun, Haroon Fazul, Harun Fazul, Fadil Abdallah Muhammad, Fadhil Haroon, Abu Seif Al Sudani, Abu Aisha, Abu Luqman, Fadel Abdalla Mohammed Ali, Fouad Mohammed.

Born [alternately] 25 August 72, 25 December 74, 25 February 74, Moroni, Comoros Islands; 5'3" to 5'5", 120 to 140 pounds; speaks French, Swahili, Arabic, English, Comoran; black hair, brown eyes, cark complexion. Comoros, Kenyan citizenship. Mohammed likes to wear baseball caps and tends to dress casually. He is very good with computers.

Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was indicted on 17 September 98 in the Southern District of New York, for his alleged involvement in the bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya on 7 August 98.

IMAD FAYEZ MUGNIYAH



Wanted for conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, to commit hostage taking, to commit air piracy resulting in murder, to interfere with a flight crew, to place a destructive device aboard an aircraft, to have explosive devices about the person on an aircraft, and to assault

passengers and crew; air piracy resulting in murder; air piracy; hostage taking; interference with flight crew; and placing explosives aboard aircraft; placing destructive device aboard aircraft; assault aboard aircraft with intent to hijack with a dangerous weapon and resulting in serious bodily injury; aiding and abetting.

Alias: Hajj.

Born 1962, Lebanon; 5'7", 145-150 pounds; speaks Arabic; Brown hair, dark eyes; Lebanese citizen. Mugniyah is the alleged head of the security apparatus for the terrorist organization, Lebanese Hizballah. He is thought to be in Lebanon.

Imad Fayez Mugniyaah was indicted for his role in planning and participation in the 14 June 1985 hijacking of a commercial airliner which resulted in the assault on various passengers and crew members, and the murder of one U.S. citizen.

MUSTAFA MOHAMED FADHIL

Wanted for murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting in death. Aliases: Moustafi Ali Elbishy, Mustafa Mohammed,



Mustafa Fazul, Hussein, Hassan Ali, Mustafa Muhamed Fadil, Abd Al Wakil Masri, Abu Aanis, Abu Yussrr, Hassan Ali, Nu Man, Khalid, Abu Jihad, Abu Jihad al-Nubi

Born 23 June 76, Cairo Egypt; 5'3" to 5-5",

120 to 140 pounds; speaks Arabic, Swahili, reads English; black, short, curly hair; dark eyes, olive complexion; Egyptian, Kenyan citizen.

Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil was indicted in the Southern District of New York on 16 December 98 for his alleged involvement in the 7 August 98 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, and for conspiring to kill U.S. citizens.

SHEIKH AHMED SALIM SWEDAN



Wanted for murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Aliases: Sheikh Ahmad Salem Suweidan, Sheikh Ahmed Salem Swedan, Sheikh Swedan,

Sheikh Bahamada Ahmed Ally, Bahamad, Sheik Bahamad, Amed the Tall.

Born 9 April 60 or 9 April 69, Mombassa, Kenya; 5'8" to 6'0", 175 pounds; speaks Arabic, Swahili, English; black hair, brown eyes, dark complexion; Kenyan citizenship. Sometimes wears a light beard or moustache and has managed a trucking business in Kenya.

Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan was indicted on 16 December 98 in the Southern District of New York, for his alleged involvement in the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, and for conspiring to kill U.S. citizens.

ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN



Wanted for damage by means of fire or an explosive; damage by means of fire or an explosive to U.S. property; transport in interstate commerce an explosive; destruction of motor vehicles or motor vehicle facilities; conspiracy to commit offense or defraud the U.S.,

aiding and abetting; penalty of death or life imprisonment when death results; assault of a federal officer in the line of duty; commission of a crime of violence through the use of a deadly weapon or device.

Aliases: Abdul Rahman Said Yasin; Aboud Yasin, Abdul Rahman S. Taha, Abdul Rahman S. Taher.

Born 10 April 60, in Bloomington, Indiana; 5'10", 180 pounds; black hair, brown eyes, olive complexion; U.S. citizen. Probably has a chemical burn scar on his right thigh. Yasin is an epileptic.

Abdul Rahman Yasin is wanted for his alleged participation in the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center, New York City on 26 February 93, which resulted in six deaths, the wounding of numerous individuals, and the significant destruction of property and commerce.

FAHID MOHAMMED ALLY MSALAM



Wanted for murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Aliases: Fahid Moham-med Ally, Fahid Moham-med Ali Musalaam, Fahid Mohammed Ali Asalam, Fahid Muhamad Ali Salem, Muhammed Ally Msalam, Usama Al-Kini, Fahid Ally Msalam.

Born 19 February 76, in Mombasa, Kenya; 5'6" to 5'8", 160 to 170 pounds; speaks Swahili, Arabic, English; black, curly hair; brown eyes, dark complexion. Kenyan citizen. Sometimes wears a light beard or moustache, and has worked as a clothing vendor.

Fahid Msalam was indicted on 16 December 1998 in the Southern District of New York, for his alleged involvement in the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, and for conspiring to kill U.S. nationals.

AHMAD IBRAHIM AL-MUGHASSIL



Wanted for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals; conspiracy to kill U.S. employees; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; conspiracy to destroy property of the U.S.; conspiracy to attack national defense utilities; bombing resulting in death;

use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; murder while using destructive device during a crime of violence; murder of federal employees; attempted murder of federal employees.

Alias: Abu Omran.

Born 26 June 67, Qatif-Bab al Shamal, Saudi Arabia; 5'4", 145 pounds; speaks Arabic, Farsi; black hair, brown eyes, olive complexion; Saudi Arabian citizen.

Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Mughassil has been indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for the 25 June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED



Wanted for conspiracy to kill nationals of the United States.

Aliases: Ashraf Refast Nabith Henin, Khalid Abdul Wadood, Salem Ali, Fadhil Bin Adballah Bin Khalid.

Born 14 April 65 or 1 March 64, in Kuwait; medium height, slightly overweight, black hair, brown eyes, olive complexion; Kuwaiti citizen. Mohammed is known to wear either a full beard or a trimmed beard, or he may be clean-shaven. He has been known to wear glasses.

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is wanted for his alleged involvement in a conspiracy plot, based in Manila, The Philippines, to bomb commercial U.S. airlines flying routes to the United States from Southeast Asia in January 1995. He was indicted in the Southern District of New York in January 1996.

MUHAMMAD ATEF



Wanted for murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting death.

Aliases: Abu Hafs, Abu Hafs El-Masry El-Khabir; Taysir, Sheikh Taysir Abdullah, Abu

Khadijah.

Date of birth unknown, born in Egypt; 6'4" to 6'6", thin build; speaks Arabic, dark brown to black hair, dark eyes, olive complexion; Egyptian citizen. Atef is alleged to be Usama bin Laden's second in command of the terrorism organization Al-Qaida.

Muhammed Atef has been indicted for his alleged involve-

ment with the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.

ALI SAED BIN ALI EL-HOORIE



Wanted for conspiracy to kill U.S. Nationals; conspiracy to murder U.S. employees; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; conspiracy to destroy property of the U.S.; conspiracy to attack national defense utilities; bombing

resulting in death; use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; murder while using destructive device during a crime of violence; murder of federal employees; attempted murder of federal employees.

Alias: Ali Saed Bin Ali Al-Houri.

Born 10 or 11 July 65, El Dibabiya, Saudi Arabia; 5'2", 130 pounds; speaks Arabic; black hair black eyes, olive complexion, mole on face. Saudi-Arabian citizen.

Ali Saed Bin El-Hoorie has been indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for the 25 June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

SAIF AL-ADEL



Wanted for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States and to destroy the National Defense Utilities of the United States.

Aliases: Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi, Seif Al Adel, Ibrahim Al-Madani.

Born 11 April 63 or 11 April 60, in Egypt; speaks Arabic; dark hair, dark eyes, olive complexion; Egyptian citizen. Al-Adel is thought to be affiliated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), and is believed to be a high-ranking member of the Al-Qaida organization, currently in Afghanistan.

Saif Al-Adel is wanted in connection with the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.

IBRAHIM SALIH MOHAMMED AL-YACOUB



Wanted for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals; conspiracy to murder U.S. employees; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; conspiracy to destroy property of the U.S.; conspiracy to attack national defense utilities; bombing resulting in death; use of weapons

of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; murder while using destructive device during a crime of violence; murder of federal employees; attempted murder of federal employees.

No Known aliases.

Born 16 October 66, in Tarut, Saudi Arabia; 5'4", 150 pounds; speaks Arabic; black hair, brown eyes, olive complexion; Saudi Arabian citizen.

Ibrahim Salih Mohammed Al-Yacoub has been indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for the 25 June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex, in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

In all cases, subjects are wanted for terrorist crimes, and should be considered armed and dangerous. \varkappa



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Been There, Done That Sof Interviews Soviet Spetsnaz Vet Of War In Afghanistan

PHOTOS COURTESY VALERY SHILIN'S GUN CLUB

Currently, no one has more modern experience fighting in Afghanistan than the former Soviets. From 1979 until 1989 they found themselves embroiled in a bitter war there. Whereas others hypothesize and give their opinion, they speak from experience on what it's like to actually wage war in the mountains of Afghanistan. To gain insight on the region, the Afghans, and what our Special Forces should expect, *SOF* interviewed a former Soviet Spetsnaz trooper whom we'll call Andrei.



SOF: Did you receive any special training prior to your deployment?

Andrei: Yeş, mostly ambush, mining, and demining. Also sniper training for me personally, and mountain training as well. This lasted for three months.

SOF: What was the size of the unit you normally operated with, and your weapons?

Andrei: Typically 22 people or somewhere around there. There were five officers, four NCOs, and the rest sergeants and privates. We broke down into three basic groups. For fire support we had three PKMs, two SVD sniper rifles, and four RPK-74s. We had one AGS-17 that we would take or sometimes leave, depending on the operation, due to its weight. If the convoy is small there was no need for that weapon. We carried two RPG-7s if the convoy had vehicles, with enough rock-

ets. Each group would have about three or four RPG-18s we called "Fly." The standard rifle was the 5.45x39 AKS-74. Two of these per group had a GP-25 grenade launcher for a total of six. Plus there were two 7.62x39 AKMSs per groups with PBS suppressors. At this time there was no sub-sonic 5.45x39 ammunition so we used the 7.62x39 AKMSs. Subsonic 7.62x39 ammunition was difficult to come across too, though, and they used the regular rounds as well. Every man carried no less than 450 rounds and most people carried 600 rounds on them. Snipers carried around 150 rounds of 7.62x54R sniper ammunition. Spare magazines for the SVD were extremely hard to come by. Five were issued, I carried seven along with a Stetchkin machine pistol in its holster/stock stuck in the outer pocket of my pack. I carried three 20-round mags for the Stetchkin. When I carried an AKS-74 I carried nine 30round mags. Only five were issued, the other four I traded for or captured.

SOF: What did you have available for support?

Andrei: Ah, mortars and artillery, we would have a battalion that would be on standby with us on the radio. We would have a FO with us and if we needed to call in fire-support within two minutes you'd hear the round whistling in overhead. They'd make corrections and all hell would break loose. We could call in air-support and within 15-20 minutes they would arrive, depending upon terrain. We rarely went on a mission when we did not have support available.

SOF: Did Spetsnaz operate independently or were they used in joint/combined operations with other units?

Andrei: Both, depending on the mission. They could use a large battalionsized detachment of Airborne or Motorized Infantry as a diversion, such as imitating they were doing a search and destroy mission. Meanwhile Spetsnaz would complete their planned operation. They did use us once, it wasn't a large operation, to set up an ambush in the probable escape route of an armed formation of rebels being pushed by a larger Russian force. But rarely, it's mostly Spetsnaz has a specific mission in mind.

SOF: While in Afghanistan what did you observe regarding the treatment of prisoners?

Andrei: In our case we came across many, many prisoners because not everyone is annihilated after the initial fire contact. There is some wounded and unscathed. They were simply interrogated at this point while they were still in shock, which usually led to a successful interrogation. If not we had people who could interrogate them better using special skills. On our part in my unit we had no abusive treatment of prisoners beyond what you would expect. There was no ears being cut off, no eyes being poked out or anything like that. If one guy tried to resist then he would be, well you know, dead man. No fancy stuff, no throat-cutting stabbing anything like this, basically walk away from the spot. Those who would cooperate, depending upon what type of operation we were on, we would take everyone that was captured and offered no resistance and put them in the same helicopters with the wounded and evacuated first. They would be then turned over to "Greens" or Khad (Afghan security service), what they do to them then I don't know. I heard one story of one guy captured three times in a couple weeks, the Greens had just kept letting him go. So they might cut them loose or they might kill them, I don't know.

SOF: What was the Muj treatment of Russian POWs?

Andrei: Being captured by the Mujahideen was one thing you did not want to do. It was always in the back of your mind that the last grenade was yours. What they done there was skin people alive, they ah, I guess desecrated bodies, cut off heads, awful shit. It was some Medieval stuff. Some of the bodies that we came across ... had all kinds of traces of extreme torture. So one thing you didn't want to do was be captured that's for sure. There was several instances where troops called fire in upon themselves. It's a common thing in guerrilla warfare for the enemy to hug your position thinking that your artillery will not fire on them or if they do fire they will be ineffective, like within 100 meters or so. So in that case if you're running out of ammo and are receiving fire from all sides you might want to draw them in a little closer and call fire in upon yourself. There were instances like that.

SOF: Did your unit conduct LRRPs?

Andrei: No, long-range patrols are not possible in the region of Afghanistan that I conducted operations in due to the terrain. Any such patrol would be easily spotted from miles away. Most of the intelligence was gathered up by informants, villagers, local Army intelligence, and agents. There was of course a lot of air recon and confirmations. We also used our Border Guards advance posts because they were stationed deep in Afghan territory. So we used their reconnaissance as well because they would in their regular duty set up what they call a "Secret" which is groups of three to seven men to watch the territory. Their sole purpose being to relay information.

SOF: Were Soviet intelligence agencies all basically trying to get the Afghans to rat on each other?

Andrei: Oh yeah, and there was plenty of that going on. One guy would even work as a scout, as a guide, so that he could keep the last car in the caravan. So they were all monetarily and materially motivated, the informants. There was no, well I'm sure there was some for idea of World Socialism, but I think that those were isolated cases. Majority of that shit was all done for monetary rewards. All I know is that it was going on big-time and that the intelligence apparatus of the Soviet Army was encouraging it. But I want to make the statement that I was not involved in it so that my information of any of this is secondary only

SOF: What was the level of risk for a typical Spetsnaz operation? How often did you sustain casualties?

Andrei: 95% of our operations were casualty-free. If we did take a casualty it was usually such a light wound that they did not need to be evacuated. Except on my last operation where there were seven people killed and two seriously wounded. **SOF:** If someone was wounded, what was the chance of their being successfully evacuated?

Andrei: One hundred percent. All of our wounded were successfully evacuated. There was an order given at the very highest level that not one trooper would be left out there dead or wounded. Sometimes even full-blown operations would be conducted to retrieve bodies. We never left anyone behind. The confidence that we would be pulled out was extremely high. Plus, we knew some of the helicopter pilots that had flown with us, they are unsung heroes those guys, those guys were real. I would go with them on any operations because I knew that they would exert every possible effort to come get you.



SOF: What was the most dangerous type of operation?

Andrei: Shit, every one of them was a dangerous one. I suppose going into a village after rebels was the worst. Because your flanks are protected but your rear is wide open. When you think you've cleared the area some old man with a flint-lock rifle would fire at you. So you were always alert going through the dwellings.

SOF: What were their strengths, what were they good at?

Andrei: Evading, waiting, superior knowledge of locale so to speak. They knew every crevice, every hole, every cave, all the paths, stuff like that. They were good at evading. They'd fire at you and then before you know it a little old man with a donkey and a bunch of kindling wood would be walking by you. But little did you know that he probably was carrying Lee Enfield in the kindling wood.

SOF: What were their weaknesses?

Andrei: Well, of course their equipment lacked. And they were handicapped by us cutting off their supply



lines. There also was no single organization. Often we would sit on the sidelines and watch them fight among themselves. For sphere of influence I guess. For example the Southern Pushtus would not want to have anything to do with the Tadzhiks and Uzbeks of the North. You see it going on right now.

SOF: Were you ever able to exploit this weakness?

Andrei: Sure! We would in some areas and provinces sign a non-aggression pact with local villagers and armed groups not to conduct any operations against them and they would not do the same against us. We would share intelligence with them and supply them with weapons (laughing) and they in return would tell us where one group is moving, when the caravans with arms where coming, or even give us scouts. It's a normal practice and has been going on forever.

SOF: What impact did the introduction of Stingers have on Russian operations in general?

Andrei: Well, it changed right away how helicopters and planes were flying. They would for example have a predetermined approach to the airport. You have to understand that most of the direct hits were on the low-flying cargo planes that were about to land or take off. And on Mi-8 and Mi-6s while they were taking-off or landing or while they were maneuvering, while



they were handicapped, not while they were fully flying. Rarely were there any Mi-24s shot down, but there were some Mi-24s shot down. Also 25% of all so-called shot-down helicopters were actually hit but were then restored and put back in service. Impact was great, of course, so they changed how they took off and landed, and installed heat decoys on them.

SOF: Did the Soviet Army place more emphasis on Special Operations in contrast to conventional operations in 1985/86?

Andrei: I can't speak for the whole Army because there were a lot of SpecOps going on like I described in my previous comments. Basically, there was cutting off supply routes, destroying their infrastructure of any kind, any communications that they had, annihilating large gatherings of rebels, and stuff like that. The buggers would just be terrified. There were legends about the black Spetsnaz trooper named Kurbashi. They were all freaking afraid of him because they knew what they [Spetsnaz] were capable of and that they came down like Allah's Sword of Fury on them [Kurbashi, loosely "black commando" was a "ghost," a nightmare of the Afghans who materialized in the form of Soviet Spetsnaz]. If they knew that it was just Motorized Infantry or Airborne troops, although they were well regarded, it was one thing. But if you were talking about Spetsnaz, they were simply terrified. And I'm sure that it didn't come to us [Soviet Spetsnaz] as a give-me, it had to be earned, practiced and by 1985-87 they already had five to six years behind their shoulders of successful operations.

SOF: Do you think there were more SpecOps missions in 1985/86 than in the early 1980s?

Andrei: I have no idea. Don't forget though, the whole war started with a SpecOps mission capturing and killing the Prime Minister and capturing the palace and all the ministries and blockading all the military detachments of the Afghan Army at their base. Basically a *coup d'état*.

SOF:What was the effect of winter on Afghan operations?

Andrei: They basically came to a halt or slowed down dramatically. A) They were not receiving any resupply,

other than from the south. B) It's cold as a sonofabitch. It doesn't matter if you live there or not, it's cold. All their passages in the mountains were covered in snow with avalanches. Snow started in my area of operations in October/November time-frame and ended late March/April. It would get down to -50 F with the wind chill.

SOF: What was the effect of winter on Spetsnaz?

Andrei: There would be no convoys so, after receiving information from informants, we would look where one particular rebel group would be R&Ring and try to catch and annihilate them. It was very slow, though. In the summer where maybe we would have two week-long operations a month. In the winter we would have a week-long operation every two months, rarely every month. Kinda like 50% down from your usual output.



SOF: For use in Afghanistan what would be the minimum cartridge you would want body armor to stop?

Andrei: (Laughing) .303 British. If you can stop that you would be pretty much defended against anything but the .50 calibers.

SOF: Was there any training that you did not receive that you think would have been beneficial?

Andrei: Yeah we could have used a little more Alpinist training. Not just the mountain but mountain-scaling with the ropes and stuff like that would probably be most useful. But not really; anything new we caught onto real fast. We knew how to set up the booby traps and mines and shoot our weapons well. The biggest thing was to train your body to be deprived of oxygen, water, and the climate changes. It is important to be training in exactly the same environment, and not just for two weeks,

Continued on page 79



he curve of a projectile's trajectory fired from any small arm is a fact that all shooters and professional operators must learn for first round, cold barrel hits at extended distances. Line of sight is always a straight line within earth's atmosphere, but small-arms trajectories are flights following a curve from point of origin to impact. Low velocity, heavy bullet rounds are often described as having "rainbow" trajectories, while high velocity, light bullets are said to be "flat shooting." The truth is all current small arms fire projectiles that fly through an arc as the round travels to its target.

This ballistic arc is a result of gravity

The Kimber Classic .22 Rimfire Rifle

acting on a free falling body at speed and it can not be ignored. Future scientific breakthroughs hold the promise for true flat shooting projectiles simply because of their potential for an exponential increase in projectile velocities. If Absolute Conductivity can ever be achieved at room temperature then it is theoretically possible to launch titanium needles or graphite eggs at velocities approaching 25,000 to 32,000 feet per



The Kimber Classic .22 owes much of its design to the legendary Mauser K98 rifle, but it is not a remake of Fritz Houser's .22 rimfire-conversion of that rifle. It is new and better. It is not even a remake of the original Kimber Model 82.

second from portable rail-gun launching platforms using stored electrical energy batteries as the power source.

Should this potential technology ever become feasible, a revolution in small arms will occur that makes current small arm platforms as obsolete as flint-head arrows and hickory long bows. But until this technology becomes feasible, if it ever does, all small-arms operators are forced to deal with the intricacies and complexities of a projectile's ballistic curve, even at moderate ranges and, most certainly, at extended distances. In addition, they must learn how to read the wind and the extent of its influence on the projectile as it travels this arc.

Naturally, the logical solution to this training and operational dilemma is for the shooter/operator to gain practical experience with his assigned weapon and ammunition at known distances, but here another problem raises its ugly head. The number of extended and known distance firing ranges are quickly becoming unavailable and being zoned from existence as a result of ongoing urban sprawl in the United States, especially east of the Mississippi River, and in addition to the more developed countries of the world. Ranges that were way out in the boonies 25 years ago are now often sandwiched between multiple housing developments and shopping malls. Even though projectiles are easily contained within these facilities, the threat of an unwanted injury or death to trespassing adolescents and youngsters is frequently sufficient to close the ranges. It doesn't seem to matter whether the range is public, private or law enforcement only. The result is often the same. It is becoming more and more difficult to find a place to train and practice known distance and extended distance rifle shooting, which is a mission essential skill for any police precision marksman located on an airport perimeter.

The answer to these seemingly separate, but equally developing dilemmas may be found in a single source — a well-made .22 rimfire rifle and telescopic sight. After our testing we can easily say it takes something like the Kimber Classic .22 rifle used in combination with the Burris Fullfield II and its Ballistic Plex reticle to create a training rifle that duplicates the accuracy and predictability of standard service



The five-round single-column magazine used by the Kimber Classic .22 rifle is flush mounted and retained by a spring steel latch. The bottom metal, as well as the triggerguard, are made from steel.

centerfire sniper rifle.

At the same time, this rifle and scope combination can train the operator to work with a graduated scale reticle, the ballistic curve at different distances and the influence different value crosswinds can have on bullet placement.

Most every police range and civilian club sport shooting range in the country has a 100-yard rifle range. While some may argue the point, many new and reasonably well-made centerfire sporting rifles equipped with adequate scope sights will easily keep five rounds inside an inch at 100 yards (approximately 1 minute of angle) and 3 inches at 300 yards with good ammunition. The problem for the shooter is knowing where to aim and how much to "hold over" for any target beyond 100 yards. However, many shooters, both police and civilian, are not able to practice on a routine basis at anything past 100 yards.

The Kimber Classic .22 rifle and Burris Ballistic Plex scope are a partial answer to this dilemma for precision marksman.

The Answer ...

The idea of using a .22 rimfire rifle for training, obviously, is not a new one. Prior to World War II, Fritz Houser designed a .22 rimfire rifle that was identical in basic operation and size to the German Army's K98 bolt action rifle. There were two versions; one was a repeater, feeding from a magazine and the second version was a sin-

The average law-enforcement precision marksman engagement is 72 yards. This is universally recognized among law-enforcement authorities and trainers with the result being the need for long distance or extended distance marksmanship training is often ignored or overlooked.

There is a viable need for all police precision marksmen to be skilled at extended distance, cold barrel shooting. A police marksman in Midland, Texas, illustrated the prob-

lem perfectly when he was asked what was the longest shot he was ever set up for.

"It was 430 yards from our hide to the main terminal at the local airport."

When questioned further,

he revealed he was covering a radical fringe political rally and his department had received good intelligence there was going to be trouble. That distance was as close as he could get, maintain a full field of fire, and still remain concealed.

While the Burris Fullfield II 3X-9X-40mm scope with the Ballistic Plex reticle was not designed specifically for a law-enforcement application, it will still fulfill the need.

Burris optics (Burris Company, Inc. Dept. SOF, 331 East 8th St., Greeley, CO 80631-9559; toll-free: 1-888-228-7747; fax: 970-356-8702; web: www.burrisoptics.com) is an American company and while they do use some foreign made parts, they are few in number. The Burris Fullfield II with the Ballistic Plex reticle has just under one hundred parts, only five of them come from off-shore. The remainder are made here in the United States of America. ed with the proprietary Burris HiLume R multi-chemical multicoat for maximum brightness. The exterior of the scope tube is hard anodized and Burris uses double internal springs to create internal adjustments that utilize steel on steel with positive, repeatable, audible click adjustments. Burris also uses their own spe-

Burris uses only ultra-pure premium grades of glass and

they are ground and polished to a couple of millionths of an

inch to achieve as clear a view as possible. Each lens is coat-

cially made 'quad-seals' to prevent leakage and warranty their scope as "water-proof", not just 'water-resistant.'

During the manufacturing process Burris personnel will fill

and purge each scope with laboratory grade dry nitrogen 24 times to ensure there is no moisture remaining inside the scope and that the nitrogen inside the scope is well-sealed.

The idea for the Ballistic Plex scope came from Patrick Beckett, the Director of Marketing at Burris. He designed it for the average sport hunter, but the versatility of this system is far ranging. (No pun intended) The Ballistic Plex reticle is a variation of a conventional 'duplex' reticle, but in place of the conventional thin crosshair and thick post below the intersection of the crosshairs there is a vertical stadia crosshair with a series of three graduations before the thin line meets the thick post normally found on a duplex crosshair.

For purposes of illustration, let's say you are shooting a CCI MiniMag .22 Long Rifle round with a 36-grain hollow-point bullet through your .22 rimfire rifle. This found develops 1,280-feet-per-second muzzle velocity and you sight the



gle shot that was virtually a carbon copy of the K98 service rifle.

The Kimber .22 rifle owes much to the Mauser design, but it is not a remake. Nor is the present Kimber Classic .22 rifle a reintroduction of the original Kimber Model 82 .22 rifle. The Kimber Classic .22 is a new gun and it was designed by Nehemiah Sirkis. Sirkis is one of the few freelance gun designers operating in the world today.

When Kimber was resurrected from the ashes of the original company, the new owners approached Sirkis to redevelop the old Model 82. Sirkis examined the drawings quite closely and after careful inspection of the tools and dies needed to manufacture that rimfire rifle design, as well as the design itself, he concluded he simply didn't like it.

For one thing the Kimber Model 82 from the original firm had a safety that needed tuning and Sirkis strongly believes any safety that needs tuning is too dangerous to manufacture and sell. There were other problems with the Model 82 in terms of the manner and methods of production and none of it yielded an easy answer to the owner's demand that a Kimber .22 rifle be produced. Sirkis proved the old design was too costly to remanufacture and then proceeded to design a gun that is superior to the original, if not any other rimfire rifle made in the United States.

Sirkis was raised in Israel before World War II and he remembered a rimfire K98 training rifle he shot as an eight-year-old youth in Israel. That experience fostered the present design. Only his design, although heavily influenced by the Mauser, is one meant for an American market where it can easily utilize scope rings and mounts, as well as the accompanying scope sight.

The Kimber Classic .22 is a boltaction rimfire rifle in .22 Long Rifle caliber. It uses a Mauser-style claw extractor and a Timney-type trigger mechanism, but the geometry of the trigger system is altogether different from that found in a Timney trigger system. It has a detachable box magazine that holds five rounds of .22 Long Rifle ammunition and it sports a traditional, almost classic, American profile in terms of its stock design and layout.

The most unusual aspect to the Kimber Classic .22 is the fact the bolt is off-center to the boreline. Most all previous .22 rimfire rifles featured internal off-set firing-pin assemblies inside the bolt to strike the rims on rimfire ammunition. Sirkis choose a different path and the rewards are great in terms of rimfire rifle engineering. The bolt is .0100-inch off-center, being positioned upwards above the centerline of the barrel. The belly of the receiver is much thicker than the top and this provides better bedding and rigidity to the receiver.

Because the bolt is off-center, the firing pin is larger and located in the center of the bolt. This provides a faster lock time while at the same time increasing firing-pin strength. The other advantage, and this is extremely important in a rimfire rifle, is the gun can be dry-fired continuously without fear of breaking any components in the firing pin assembly.

The extractor is a Mauser-style fulllength claw extractor and acts and operates exactly like an original Mauser rifle extractor. It is a "controlled round feeding" system and as such is extremely positive in chambering rounds fed from the five-round magazine.

How It Starts ...

The Kimber Classic .22 receiver starts life as a billet of 4140 carbon steel that is 1.25 inches in diameter. It is then shaped into the final dimension by state-of-the-art CNC machining. The

gun and Burris Ballistic Plex scope in at 50 yards. Point of aim equals point of impact at 50 yards.

The bullet from that round at the listed velocity will drop 1.7 inches at 75 yards. The first crossbar below the crosshair has 1.2 inches of correction, so the point of impact will be 1/2-inch low if you use the first crossbar below the crosshair as your aiming indicator.

Moving to a 100 yard target, the bullet will drop 5.4 inches. The second crossbar below the crosshair has 4.5 inches of correction factored into its position, so that means the bullet will strike 9/10-inch low if you maintain a perfect aim using the second crossbar.

The third, and last, crossbar has 16.6 inches of correction and the 36

gr HP CCI MiniMag bullet will drop 19.3 inches at 150 yards. Actually, the bullet drop and the third crossbar coincide at approximately 146 yards, but if the target is exactly at 150 yards and the perfect shot can be made using the last, or third, crossbar, the round should strike 2.7 inches below the point of aim. The amazing part is it works just this easy even with a rimfire rifle.

All of this makes it easy to shoot a .22 rimfire rifle at these distances and still make first round hits with little effort. It doesn't matter if you are a sport shooter or a law-enforcement



The reticle on the Burris Fullfield II with the Ballistic Plex reticle is a modification of the popular 'duplex' reticle used by sport shooters. The difference is below the crosshair the vertical stadia line features three crossbars. The first crossbar is set for 1.2 inches of correction at 100 yards, the second crossbar is set for 4.5 inches at 100 yards, and the third crossbar is set for 16.6 inches of correction at 100 yards.

professional, this device helps answer the question where do you hold if the situation is fluid and the target is moving away — rapidly? Additionally, for the law-enforcement professional this device in combination with a rifle like the Kimber Classic .22 provides an alternative for convenient and inexpensive training whether it is known distance or extended distance ranges.

As mentioned in the Kimber Classic .22 review, wind is a big factor with any .22 rimfire rifle, but the same is true when shooting centerfire rifles at ranges past 400 yards.

The wind drift with a .22 rimfire rifle at the distances mentioned is analogous to shooting a

centerfire rifle at 500 yards. In each instance, the shooter must know how and where to hold for the known distance target, or the estimated range, and the Burris Fullfield II with the Ballistic Plex reticle allows him to compensate for wind influence by using the proper amount of thin horizontal crosshair, either left or right of vertical stadia line.

The Burris Fullfield II with the Ballistic Plex reticle has a manufacturer's suggested retail price of \$401.00.

For the quality provided, it is a bargain.

- F.W.J.

Kimber .22 bolt is a one-piece design unlike most others on the market today which are often made from soldered components. The Kimber .22 bolt is made from an 1.5-inch billet of 4140 carbon steel that is then cut and shaped by a CNC machining center.

The barrel for the Kimber Classic .22 is made entirely in the Kimber factory. On the Classic model the barrel is a tapered sporter weight barrel 22 inches in length. It is a carbon-steel barrel that is drilled, reamed, lapped and then button rifled. The internal finish on the barrel is exacting because it is lapped multiple times. The twist rate is the industry standard of one turn in 16 inches featuring a right-hand twist and eight lands and grooves. The muzzle features an 11-degree target crown.

The chamber is cut with a reamer made expressly to Kimber's dimensions. Although, the Kimber Classic .22 will shoot like a match rifle, it does not have an exact match chamber dimension. The Kimber Classic .22 features a chamber dimension that is a little wider at the rear to enable easier feeding of the rimfire cartridge. If Kimber ever makes a single shot rifle then they may consider the tighter dimensions of a match chamber, but now they use their own proprietary chamber dimensions. As it is, the chamber is cut with a great deal of attention being paid to precision craftsmanship using a state-of-the-art lathe, but with a methodology that many in the industry consider old fashion.

Another novel aspect to the Kimber Classic .22 design is the actual chambering of a cartridge as the bolt closes. After the bolt reaches the end of its free forward travel, the lower locking lug engages a helical cut on the bottom of the receiver that cams the bolt forward as the bolt is closed. This moves the cartridge forward 0.100-inch and everything starts with the bullet seated against the rifling. Depending upon the round used the nose of the bullet should be engaging at least .0080-inch of the rifling.

Sirkis stated, "Everything starts with the bullet biting the rifling."

The manual safety is located on the cocking piece housing and operates in exactly the same fashion as the one found on the immortal Model 70 Winchester rifle. It is, however, a two position, and not a three position safety, like the one seen on the Model 70. This manual safety works by camming back the cocking piece. It does not

THE KIMBER CLASSIC .22 RIMFIRE RIFLE		
S P	ECIFICATIONS	
Manufacturer:	Kimber	
Model:	"Classic .22" rimfire rifle.	
Mechanism Type:	turning bolt action based upon the classic Mauser K98 action, but with a rear locking action.	
Trigger Pull:	2.5 to 3.0 pounds (set at factory) trigger pull is adjustable, based upon the Timney system, but geometry is different.	
Extractor:	true full-length Mauser claw extractor that will snap over the rim of the rimfire ammunition.	
Chamber:	proprietary Kimber tapered match chamber.	
	.22 Long Rifle.	
Overall Lenght:	40.5 inches.	
	match-grade Kimber barrel.	
	I turn in 16 inches; right-hand twist; eight lands & grooves.	
Barrel Length:		
Weight, empty:	6 pounds 8 ounces (average); weight will vary with the individual densi- ty of the Claro Walnut wood.	
Magazine Capacity:	5 rounds.	
Sights:	None, but sculptured steel bases are available for Leupold or Burris rotary dovetail rings for installation of any scope sight.	
Finish:	Bead blasted blue finish on carbon-steel receiver, bottom metal and receiver.	
Performance:	Each rifle must shoot five rounds into a group measuring .400" or less, or it isn't shipped from the factory.	
Suggested Retail Price:	\$950; extra magazines are \$17.50; and the scope ring bases are \$41.00.	
Evaluation:	Finest, most accurate .22 rimfire rifle currently produced in the United States of America. Would make an excellent training rifle for any oper- ator interested in accuracy or extended-distance shooting.	

touch the sear and as a result is far safer because it acts directly on the firing pin. Unlike the Model 70 centerfire rifle, when the Kimber Classic .22 manual safety is in the rear position it is still possible to work the bolt and clear or load the chamber as needed. There is no locked position. However, whenever the safety is forward and in the "OFF-SAFE" position, a red dot is revealed at the base of the lever next to the cocking piece housing to indicate it is a 'hot' firearm.

The trigger pull is set for a pull weight of between two-and-a-half to three pounds by the factory. The pull weight on the test rifle tested exactly at two pounds. There was absolutely no overtravel or backlash. To have a trigger with these characteristics on a factory gun is virtually unheard of in this lawyer-dominated and lawsuit-waiting world. It is also a sign of the excellence put into this rifle. The test rifle's trigger is without question one of the best available from any domestic rimfire rifle producer in this country. In keeping with a trigger of this quality is the sculptured steel trigger guard and the bottom metal surrounding the magazine release. It is all blued-steel and there is no anodized alloy parts to lessen the appearance of this rifle.

Attention to precision detail continues even to the method used to fit the barrel to the receiver. The best rimfire target rifles in the world do not have their barrels threaded into the receiver. They use a technique called "interference fit" and the same technique is used with the Kimber Classic .22 rifle. The main thing to remember is the barrel shank is slightly larger than the opening in the receiver.

The receiver is mounted in a fixture and then two butane flames heat the front of the receiver until it changes color. At that point, the barrel is literally pushed into the front of the receiver until it reaches the headspace stop and stops. It is an easy process and after the receiver cools, the barrel is pinned to the receiver. For those who question this process they should be reminded the excellent shooting Steyr SSG bolt action, centerfire rifle uses exactly the same process, as did the World War Two era GEW43 and MP44 rifles.

Rifles using an interference fit generally demonstrate more accuracy than those utilizing traditional threads. The advantage for the manufacturer, besides an improvement in accuracy, is there is no need to time the threading to match the extractor groove to the



Because the bolt is offset in the receiver, the firing pin channel and firing-pin assembly are positioned in the very center of this rimfire bolt. The full length extractor is a true Mauser claw extractor, but it is one that will snap over the rim of the rimfire ammunition safely.

extractor on the bolt. It is also easier to set the headspace of the rifle. For those who may have a concern about changing the barrel should something bad happen to their rifle, the factory has a hydraulic fixture that will easily remove the barrel from the receiver once the locking pin has been removed from the receiver.

The test rifle was the base level Kimber Classic .22 and yet it still featured a Grade A Claro Walnut stock. Optional models of the Kimber .22 include the Target model with a laminate stock, and the SuperAmerica with the most expensive and most fancy Grade AAA Claro walnut stock available. As it was, the test rifle featured fine-line checkering on the pistol grip and on the forearm. Checkered at 20 lines per inch, the checkering is handcut and the test rifle checkering lacked any evidence of run-ons or non-parallel cuts. Every line was straight and true. As you would expect on a rifle with this much detail to quality, the grip cap is steel and not plastic or some other synthetic material. The buttpad is a solid soft red rubber that helps convey a sense and feel of quality to this rimfire rifle.

The barrel is free floating and the stock forearm doesn't touch any part of the barrel. A piece of stationary paper will easily slide between the barrel and forearm right up to the front of the receiver. Yet, the gap between these two is barely visible.

Kimber management considered glass bedding the action to the stock, but pre-production testing demonstrated the aluminum pillar bedding and the recoil lug were so successful in transferring the recoil forces to the wood glass bedding didn't make a bit of difference.

As for mounting scope sights on the rifle, Kimber makes their own scal-



The manual safety is located on the cocking piece housing and operates in exactly the same fashion as the one found on the immortal Winchester Model 70 rifle. It is, however, a two-position manual safety, and not a three-position one like that found on the Model 70. The bolt can be operated in either position.

loped bases from solid steel and they are designed to work with standard rotary dovetail rings from Leupold, Burris or others. The blue finish of the test rifle was a bead blasted blue finish that was not highly reflective.

How Did It Shoot?

Kimber will not ship a Classic .22 rifle if it does not put five rounds into a group measuring .400-inches at a distance of 50 yards. I believe it. Unfortunately, I am not a machine rest so don't take our test groups as evidence the test rifle failed this standard. It did not.

The rifle after mounting the Burris Fullfield II scope with the Ballistic Plex reticle was sighted in for a zero at 25 yards that held approximately 3/8th of an inch high.

Our testing, with several different shooters, indicated the rifle would easily shoot inside a half-inch at 50 yards if good ammunition was used and there was no wind. On the day the photo groups were shot, the wind was definitely a factor, if not worse. The range being used lack wind flags. As a result you will notice the influence of wind drift in the photographed groups, but also notice these groups are more or less linear in distribution. Dwight van Brunt, Kimber's Vice President, recommended Winchester 40-grain Power Point and that was the ammunition was used throughout all our testing.

Lacking any ballistic coefficient data for this round it was still relatively simple to determine the aiming points for various distances with the Kimber Classic .22 and the Burris Fullfield II scope. The rifle was sighted in at 25 yards and set with an impact point 3/8inch above the point of aim. Next, the rifle was fitted with the short, swiveling Harris bipod and we moved to the 100 yard line. Firing a group of five rounds with a center of target point of aim provided a group that measured exactly 5 inches below the point of aim. Using the second crossbar it was then easy to put five rounds on, or extremely near, a two inch Shoot-N-C target disc. The problem being the wind influence (6 to 7 mph, full-value, left to right, with gusts of 10 mph) on a range that lacked wind flags, but still the best five-shot group at 100 yards measured 1.4 inches, center to center. That only illustrates what this rifle is capable of doing.

The Kimber Classic .22 is an accurate, if not *the* most accurate, rimfire rifle made in the U.S.A. today, and an extremely fine one at that. It has the capability to provide state of the art service as a training rifle to any police marksman in the country and can do so at a fraction of the cost, even if the extended distance ranges were available, of any centerfire rifle system. The difficulty, of course, is the diminishing availability of extended rifle ranges for most operators, law-enforcement or otherwise, in this country.

The Kimber Classic .22 rimfire rifle is not intended to be a replacement system, but rather a supplemental system to the centerfire police sniper rifle and it is a cost-effective and accurate one at that, if not one of the finest .22 rimfire rifles available today.

CONTACT SHEET

Kimber Mfg. Inc. Dept. SOF, I Lawton St., Yonkers, NY 10705; phone: 914-964-0771; fax: 914-964-9340; web: www.kimberamerica.com

Burris Company, Inc. Dept. SOF, 331 East 8th St., Greeley, CO 80631; phone: 888-228-7747; fax: 970-356-8702; web: www.burrisoptics.com

Winchester Ammunition Dept. SOF, 427 North Shamrock St., East Alton, IL 62024-1174; phone: 618-258-3692; fax: 618-258-3609; web: www.winchester.com

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Harris Engineering, Inc. Dept. SOF, 999 Broadway, Barlow, KY 42024; phone: 270-334-3633; fax: 270-334-3000; web: www.cyberteklabs.com/harris/main/htm

Birchwood Casey

Dept. SOF, 7900 Fuller Road, Eden Prairie, MN 55344; phone: 800-328-6156; fax: 952-937-7979; e-mail: mmorgan@birchwoodcasey.com; web: www.birchwoodcasey.com

TORTURE TO PREVENT PART II SOF Interviews An Unabashed Authority

(n efore turning the page," General Aussaresses wrote, "it is necessary that the 'page' be read, but before it is read, it must be written." Aussaresses wrote the "page:" Services Speciaux Algerie 1955-57, a book published in May 2001, in which he detailed the gruesome French government policy of using torture and summary executions by the French military, during the bloody decolonization conflict in Algeria. The "page" has been read by thousands of Algerians and French, who for the most part reacted with horror, anger, or hypocritical shock over an issue that had already been extensively publicized and debated during the Algerian war. For Aussaresses and France, the "page" is far from being turned.

In an interview with SOF, the 83year-old General relived his agony over being assigned to Algiers on 8 January 1957, as vividly as if he had just stepped out of the office of his legendary commander in Algeria, General Massu. Massu, who had made his reputation in Indochina, and who had assumed command of the 10th Parachute Division with his customary iron fist, gave Aussaresses no options: "You will do for me the same in Algiers as you did in Vietnam and Phillipeville."

"My General, I am not here volunteering for this mission. Not at all. If I could say no, I would. No! Please No. I hated it I hated it."

"Shut up! I understand your reluctance, old boy," Massu smiled. "That proves that you understand the gravity of the situation and I know that you are the man for the job. The situation is deteriorating. Not only have the FLN infiltrated Algiers, but it is well known that the principle leaders are based there. Today, Aussaresses, we will begin to liquidate them as soon as possible, by all possible means, by order of the government. You are not here voluntarily — you know that this is not the work of a choirboy."

Torture And Summary Executions

"The task," Aussauresses recalled, "Was one that one could not accomplish without 'one dirtying one's hands,' which meant of course, the dreaded use of torture and summary executions."

In order for Massu to eradicate FLN terrorism, he had been given "special powers" by the President of the French Government, Moullet, and the Governor of Algeria, Robert La Coste. "As urban terrorism could not be eradicated in the ordinary way via the police and the courts, the parachute regiment was asked to act as both judge and executioner," Aussaresses told SOF.

Later, in Algiers, Massu took Aussaresses aside, "I am telling you in confidence that I have had a visit from some influential and very determined Pieds Noir (Colonists) who threaten to overthrow the police, if the impotent civilian police continued to be incapable of controlling the rampant, murderous terrorist attacks." The FLN had established the autonomous zone in the Moslem quarters of Algeria, notably the Casbah, from which they launched daily, unpredictable terrorists attacks against civilians and government officials, bringing the French Colonials almost to a halt. One of two foremost

FLN leaders, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, had succeeded in accelerating the terrorism against the Pied Noir to such a crisis point that they had lost all faith in the French government. The demoralized Pied Noir believed they had no option but to take desperate measures after Government officials, including the president of the General Council of Algeria, and the president of the Federation of the Mayors of Algeria, had been assassinated by another ringleader, Ali la Pointe.

BY DR. MARTIN BRASS

The fireworks, Massu informed Aussauresses, were going to start with an *action spectaculaire*. "The Pied Noir plans to assemble a convoy of flammable trucks at a large avenue at the summit of the Casbah, the FLN stronghold. When the lead truck stops on the summit, they plan to open the valves of the tanks. When the fuel inundates the Casbah, they will set it on fire.

"I estimate the carnage to be at least 70,000 deaths. The Pied Noir must be stopped!" Massu stated. "Therefore, we must neutralize the FLN. The task will be unpleasant and difficult, you understand, but we have to be ruthless." "Ruthless" meant torture and summary executions.

"In the meantime, we are threatened by an FLN-sponsored insurrectional strike set for 28 January," he continued.

"Why this date?" Aussaresses asked. "That is the day that the General Assembly of the UN is scheduled to meet. An FLN delegation plans to provoke a debate on the Algerian question, in which, naturally, France will plead the incompetence of the UN."

"Stop the strike. You have less than 20 days. Proceed with arrests." "How do you expect me to do that? How can I make arrests?" Asked Aussauresses. "Compiling an intelligence picture of this nature will take months."

"Start with the files of the police." "Which service?"

"That's for you to figure out. All I know is that the police have a secret dossier that will be useful in your mission."

"You believe they will take me in their confidence?"

"That's for you to orchestrate."

"I had been given an assignment that would normally take six months. I only had several weeks to accomplish a virtual mission impossible." Aussaresses said. His only contact was one police commissioner, who provided him with a dossier of 200 FLN operatives. He contacted the chief of military security and the special service SDECE (*"cremerie"* — the French counterpart of the CIA) who provided additional intelligence.

Captain Aussaresses, then 35, had become the key player of the battle of Algiers, in charge of coordinating intelligence between General Massu, the paratroopers and the police.

Algiers, a city of nearly one million inhabitants, the majority of which were the Pied Noir, was magnificent and vibrant. The situation was different in Algiers than it had been in the small town of Philippeville, where the Pied Noir were the minority. Aussauresses followed the same routine that had served him well in Philippeville, where he got to know the merchants, the restaurant customers, employees of beauty salons and bordellos, bankers, intellectuals and other Algerians sympathetic to France. Collated intelligence reports revealed thousands of FLN members.

As the arrests accelerated, the prisons began to overflow. The overflow of prisoners was installed in a camp "*de triage*" in a former school in the suburbs. From there the prisoners were taken to other camps in the south that were under heavy guard.

Massu briefed his lieutenants, "Gentlemen, you will carry out the majority of your operations at night but I expect you to be operating 24 hours a day."

Massu recruited a team to help Aussauresses and his newly appointed executive officer, Gerard Garcet, including 20 junior officers from various regiments. He advised the recruits that if they joined him, they would be expected to participate in brutal actions. All 20 accepted his challenge.

Chief among his recruits, many of which included decorated legionnaires, was the former *fellagha* (black) Babaye, who had been captured by the paratroopers in Philippeville after a fierce fight during a battle when, having run out of ammunition, he surrendered. Aussaresses became fond of the African, who, with others from the Biskra region, had been treated as virtual slaves.

"Why are you with the fels?" Aussaresses had asked.

"They did not ask my advice," he replied. "I was forced to join them."

"Would you like to work with us?" "Why not?" Babaye, who had later preempted an assassination attempt on Aussaresses life and of whom Aussauresses spoke with great affection, became his confidante and bodyguard for the remainder of the battle of Algiers.

Aussauresses disappeared some nights without explanation and his executive officer took command. He would liaise with another team that he had organized. Neither team was aware of the other, as Aussaresses believed that having two teams unknown to each other would guarantee that the mission would continue in case authorities investigated the strange activities of one or the other team at night, and put a stop to the teams' activities. Algiers was divided into four sections, each placed under the control of one of the parachute infantry regiments; the 1st RCP, of which Aussaresses was a member, the 2nd and 3rd RPC, and the 1st

REP. A regiment of artillery paratroopers and a support unit completed the division. The 1st REP was the successor of the 1st Foreign Parachutists Battalion, created in 1948 and decimated in the retreat from Cao Bang, Indochina in October 1950.

Finally, a classical territorial structure was placed in Alger Sahel sector, where the 9th Zouave (an Algerian indigenous colonial infantry corps created in 1830) were operating. A police officer, wearing the military uniform of the 10th division in order to be undetected, was dispatched with each intelligent officer.

The patrols and regiments made themselves visible, wanting to publicize their efforts to suppress the FLN and reassure the population. To meet their objective of gaining as much respect as the FLN and to prove the government's determination, the soldiers eliminated anyone who was allied with the FLN, leaving the corpses in place. The officers operated mostly at night, arresting thousands of suspects in the Casbah, and during the day they patrolled crucial facilities.

The population quickly became aware and involved, and the intelligence became increasingly plenteous and precise. Interrogations resulted in the identification of other FLN members. The intelligence picture was expanded by Roger Trinquier, who had been the brother-in-arms of Massu in the special services, and who had served as his privileged counselor and confidant. Both had been commis-



French photographer Jacques Prayer was one among millions of Frenchmen called up for duty in the war in Algeria, where he was assigned to a French regiment as their official photographer, detailed to record fallen "Fellaghas" of the FLN.

sioned as first lieutenants the same day. Trinquier had a tour in Shanghai and was still impassioned with Asia. Toward the end of the war he was wounded in Indochina. He was successful as the head of the Special Forces unit operating behind the Viet Minh lines. Trinquier had supervised the jump schools in Algeria, and was appointed by Massu as intelligence officer in charge of the battle of Algiers, along with Aussauresses who was appointed officer in charge of the action teams.

Trinquier's passion for the Napoleonic epoch helped him lay the groundwork for his offensive. Just as Napoleon had administered his regime in the conquered cities by compiling a census of the inhabitants, Trinquier dispatched his men to conduct a census all of the homes in Algiers.

Police complied a list of names of all other occupants by questioning the oldest member of the house. The information they gathered was reconfirmed by the neighbors. The absent ones became suspect and upon their return were interrogated. The results that were obtained were compared with existing information, allowing the patrols to establish more comprehensive and accurate lists.

"Preposterous Leads"

Aussauresses received his first leads from Henri Damon, who had been a Jedburg with Aussaresses. Daman was no stranger to torture, having been captured by the Milice near Reims in WWII and tortured. He had followed the advice given to all French soldiers of what action to take in the event they were apprehended and tortured: Cry loudly. His loud and incessant crying during his imprisonment alerted his team members, who liquidated his captors. In 1946, Damon and Aussaresses had worked together in the Special Forces. When they were sent back to headquarters in France, Damon was assigned in the Political sector, where

he had uncovered a Soviet gold smuggling ring. As he and two of his colleagues were walking up the stairs in the metro station Rue-de-la-Pompe, his teammates were gunned down by a masked Soviet assassin. Damon managed to lunge backwards down the stairs into the metro station, in hot pursuit by the Soviet assassin. After a wild chase down the halls, Damon managed to alert his wife from a public phone, using their code: "I have dirtied my gray suit. Quick, bring me my blue one." After his escape, Central decided that Damon needed to be assigned elsewhere for his protection. He was transferred to Algeria.

One of Damon's informants was an Algerian Moslem woman who agreed to expose her husband in exchange for a guarantee of widowhood. Disturbed and unwilling to accept the bargain, Damon paid Aussauresses a visit. Aussaresses accepted the deal and arranged for the operation to be executed.

TORTURE FROM THE **TARGET'S PERSPECTIVE**

The testimony in late 2000 of the Algerian Louisette Ighilahriz launched the recent debate regarding the use of torture and summary executions in Algeria from 1955-57. Ighilahriz told *le Monde* of her experience as a guerrilla who had been taken prisoner by French troops and tortured for three months. She described being shackled to a steel bed frame and left in her own excrement between torture sessions. Her alleged torturer, General Marcel Bigeard, the minister of justice at the time, and Jacques Massu, who was the commander of the paratroopers, had opposite responses. Bigeard denied her account whereas Jacques Massu confirmed the utilization of torture.

Malika Koriche, a former moujahide, now 62 years old, gave excruciating detail of her torture in 1957 after being arrested by the paratroopers. Her session, which took place in a school outside of Algiers, lasted for 15 days. "My turn was at night from 11 p.m. to 3 or 4 a.m." Koriche told le Monde. "Two lieutenants, including Maurice Schmitt, accompanied by a captain, interrogated me without any physical abuse. At first, they were gentle, then when they saw that I would not talk, they ordered three soldiers to carry on. I was undressed and thrown to the ground. They spread my legs and shoved bars of iron and other tools into my vagina. When I asked for a drink, a man dressed in civil uniform urinated in my mouth. I shut my mouth, but he continued. The Lieutenants were merely carrying out orders. They ordered me to shut my mouth when I cried too loud. Koriche lost sight in one eye during the "interrogation."

General Schmitt vehemently denies her account, saying that the name of Malika Koriche meant nothing to him.

"She is a terrorist, it is the testimony of an assassin, and it is possible she was interrogated, but not in this fashion.

"I did my military duty in Algeria, and throughout I respected the law and saved lives" he said. Schmitt admits that he was involved in suppressing the terrorist organization in Algiers, but the company that he directed had a primary mission of infiltrating the FLN. He admitted that he was stationed in a school east of the Casbah, but claims that Koriche is acting now for the FLN and is taking revenge for the terrorist group that had been defeated by the French military.

Koriche was convicted of having a role in the terrorist activities after she was arrested for transporting arms and charged with throwing two bombs. She was later tried and sentenced to five years in prison in France.

On the other hand, those who engaged in torture paint pictures of innocent children with limbs blown off by Algerian nationalist bombings, pictures of innocent men and women with their throats or bellies slit open with razors, knives, and axes.

World Algerian Action Coalition reports Algeria's FLN leadership, in its account of the war of independence, has buried its past. The FLN would have to explain the assassination of Abane Ramdane, one of the leaders of the FLN executed in Morocco in December 1957, by orders of three other leaders of the FLN. It would have to explain the "Bleuite" affair where 3,000 cadre from the ALN were tortured and executed by other members in April 1958. It would have to explain why 150,000 Harkis (a tribe that supported the French) and tens of thousands of Pied Noir were executed. And that would only be a beginning.

-M.B.

Another lead came from a former French Legionnaire who one day charged into Damon's Bureau.

"My Captain, you must put me in prison."

"Why?"

"Because I have been lying to you about being detained by the traffic jams and roadblocks. In fact I have been spending my time in a bordello."

"For that you should be put in prison?" Damon was amused.

"Since I am a good client and the Madame realized I was not rich, she offered to exchange time for grenades. I accepted. That is why you must put me away and deal with the bitch."

Damon responded, "OK, we'll see. For the moment keep your mouth shut about the affair and do exactly as I say."

"And the bordello?"

"You continue going there as if nothing had happened."

"And the grenades?"

"You will continue supplying them to her. I will give you a case tomorrow. Not a word. Understand?"

"As you desire, my Capitan." The legionnaire was stunned.

Damon, without telling Aussaresses, obtained the grenades from an ordnance colonel. With the help of a chief warrant officer, Damon replaced the regular grenades fuses with instantaneous fuses. He concealed the stratagem under a layer of paint. Had he crudely cut the fuse, the alteration would have been immediately noticed by the fels, who were familiar with French arms. Wanting his legionnaire to have a good time, Damon also doctored a case of rifle ammo, replacing the ball powder with high explosive which when fired, would blow the bolt through the rear of the receiver. Such tactics, Aussaresses said, were the ABCs of their profession.

The next day Damon called the legionnaire into his office, under some pretext. He gave him the grenades and cartridges. "You must give them all at once to the madam," he said. "Go to the bordello and spend as much time as necessary. When the party is finished, return immediately."

"As you order, my captain." The legionnaire was ecstatic.

A rebel in the Bab el Oued market in the center of Algeria threw one of Damon's grenades into the crowd and was immediately blown up.

Another guerrilla started to throw a grenade from a house above a crowded beach. He lost a hand.

The madam was then executed.



Whether you were of the FLN or reactionary French Pieds Noir, being captured and offered a ride by French airborne units was probably not good news.

A Strike Averted

January 26 1957, two days before the FLN-sponsored general strike was scheduled, the FLN increased its terrorist attacks. Three bombs exploded at the same time in three restaurants. In one, four women died and 37 were injured.

The organizers of the strike had not yet been apprehended, as the paratroopers had been focused on apprehending terrorists behind the bombings, and not planning how to neutralize the upcoming strike. The rebellion would paralyze the public utilities. During the night of 27 and 28 January, Aussaresses liaised with the regiments to assure that they were prepared. Each unit was to be responsible for the continued operation of a specific public service, such as power plants, phone facilities, etc. Lists of names of public service employees were systematically compared with the lists of names of the suspects identified in the interrogations. The paratroopers guarded all utilities, methodically noticing who had failed to show up for work. Those who did not show up were escorted by paratroopers from their home to their work stations. All public utilities were functioning by early morning.

Aussaresses was alerted of an impending and unexpected longshoreman's strike. To keep the port open and avert a catastrophe, 200 inmates were taken from a prison camp and escorted to the port by the paratroopers. The prisoners, who off-loaded the ships twice as fast as the regular stevedores, were reimbursed for their efforts. Aussaresses, pleased with the psychological effect that his enormous success in averting the strike had on the public and the FLN, returned to the headquarters at noon and headed for lunch. The waiters, who were supporting the strike, mocked them and refused to serve them. He rose and slapped the head waiter around a bit and he immediately returned to work. The Hotel Mâitre'd confronted him, demanding he not return to his premises for several days. "I told him what I thought of his establishment and left," Ausarresses said.

When he later asked the workers why they were striking, they said the FLN had ordered them to.

The Interrogation Dens

The battle of Algiers took place almost entirely at night.

"It was not difficult to guess that my mission demanded that I organize the arrests, and supervise the interrogatories and summary executions." Aussaresses wrote. "Although nothing was explicitly spoken, the more perceptive quickly comprehended that my role was to relieve the regiments of their more disagreeable chores and to cover those which they did do.

In Mustapha, an isolated area on the periphery of Algeria, the paratroopers occupied a large abandoned villa with two floors and large garden. The name of the villa was fateful: "la villa des Tourelles," named after the Parisian military barracks that harbored the "creamerie" and its Interrogation dens.

Aussaresses spent the day at headquarters, and at night he went to Tourelles. Each night, at 2200 hrs. he and his team would go into action and return before midnight with their suspects, which they then interrogated. He would be involved in the arrests if the operation appeared to him to be delicate or risqué. During the night the regiments informed him of their arrests and waited for him to decide who would be taken prisoner, who would be interrogated. Those definitely found to be tied to the FLN attacks but who played insignificant roles, which included most of those that were apprehended, were taken directly to the camps. The more dangerous ones were made to talk before they were liquidated.

Most of the operations in which Aussaresses took part consisted of interrogations and the others consisted of on-site executions - pure and simple. In one instance, wives had denounced their husbands as authors of the assassinations and informed of their whereabouts in a secluded cabin close to the Zeralda forest. They never arrested more than six suspects at once. Only those who were directly involved in the attacks were taken to Tourelles. The inquisitors did not bother to interrogate them and executed them in the forest. Each regiment of the 10th DP interrogated the suspects that they arrested. If the intelligence obtained passed the limits of the regiments territorial jurisdiction, the soldiers took the

A SOLDIER'S VIEW OF THE SUBJECT

n 7 September 2001, Colonel Carl F. Bernard, USA (Ret.), gave a talk on General Aussaresses' recent book, and of their work together at Fort Bragg during the early 1960s. The talk was part of the "First Friday" series of unofficial luncheon discussions held each month at the National War College at Ft. Leslie J. McNair.

Aussaresses has written a matter-of-fact and unapologetic account of his authorized role, which included the use of torture on, and assassination of, revolutionaries from 1956-57 in the city of Algiers, in attempts to surmount an egregious terrorist crisis. This book has set off a fire-storm of dispute in France of 2001 that is far from being resolved.

Bernard referred to works by other French authors, including Roger Trinquier's La Guerre Moderne and Bernard Fall's Rue sans Joie, and Hell in a Very Small Place. In 1962 Aussaresses was sent a draft of the work by Trinquier, who had been his chief in Vietnam and in Algeria, for review.

At the time, Aussaresses and Bernard had extracted some critical elements from *La Guerre Moderne* for the team in the Pentagon working on PROVN (Programs for Vietnam). The Phoenix (Phung Hoang) and the Chieu Hoilike experiences of the French were drawn from this work, and used. Trinquier's work was subsequently published by Praeger in 1964 as *Modern Warfare*; Fall wrote its introduction. Few of its very applicable lessons for our use in Vietnam were adopted.

In his recent talk, Colonel Bernard, who considers himself most unwilling to coerce a fellow human, reviewed the parallel subjects of counter-insurgency warfare and the use of torture and coercion in extreme moments during a counter-incurgency campaign, in his recollections/readings of the situation in Indochina from 1940 through the end of the U.S. involvement in 1976. Bernard reviewed the situation faced by the 10eme Parachute Division in Algiers, 1955-57 and the role taken by Paul Aussaresses in applying torture to wipe out the terrorist network wreaking havoc within the city. Bernard pointed out that in this extreme situation, the city police were subordinated to the 10eme Division to, as our Constitution phrases it, "ensure domestic tranquility."

After Bernard led the discussion with an hour of wideranging and illuminating discourse, the discussion became general and lively, lasting for another hour. The range of discussion widened to military options, including assassination, as well as more modern concepts of how to implement macro and micro counterinsurgency programs from an economic and political perspective, with Colombia and Peru as key models. Israel-Palestine was another crisis used as a relevant analog. It was pointed out that the Algerian FLN (Front Liberation Nationale) initiated and used torture and assassination extensively in the recruiting and assembly of itself, as did the Viet Cong. There followed some discussion on the role played by the Phoenix anti-VCI (Viet-Cong Infrastructure) program and the CIA's use of U.S. Navy SEAL teams to assassinate key NLF-Vietcong officials during our Vietnam war.

As with all Leftist "causes," political activists ignore the fact that what transpired in the 1950s has to be considered in the context of the time and against the prevailing values of the culture of Algeria and France in those years. Algeria cannot be judged in contemporary terms assessed by post-Cold War civilian activists.

Col. Bernard served a tour in Korea during which time he was a platoon leader with the ill-fated Task Force Smith. He also served in China with the USMC in 1945-46, Laos in 1961 with Special Forces, and a two-year tour in Vietnam, 1967-69.

SOF is grateful to Colonel Bernard for arranging the meeting in Paris between General Aussaresses, SOF Publisher Robert K. Brown and writer Martin Brass. — M.B.

prisoners to Aussaresses for further interrogation.

In Tourelles, just as in the headquarters of the regiments, torture was systematically used if the prisoners refused to talk, which was often the case. The information obtained lead to stashes of arms, munitions or explosives. Some were released. But not often.

Most of the time, Aussaresses' men took the prisoners 20 kilometers from Algeria in the "maquis Lointains" and shot them in the head then buried them. The executions never took place in the same location. Anyone who was to be eliminated was sent to Tourelles.

Each night, Aussaresses wrote the day's events and made three copies, giving the original to Massu, one copy to the resident minister Robert Lacoste, one for general Salan, the third for his archives. They listed the number of arrests made by each unit, the number of suspects tortured during interrogations, the number of those who were summarily executed by his group and by the regiments. Names were not listed unless they were those of a prominent terrorist. His activities allowed him an average of two hours of sleep each night.

Every morning, together with the intelligence chief, Trinquier, he went to meet secretly with Massu to brief him. Massu, in turn, would meet with Lacoste. Massu would always cover for his subordinates.


The meetings with the commanding officers of the regiments were kept to a minimum to avoid feeding the perilous and detestable rivalries that had developed between the units, who sought to outdo each other in the number of arms seized.

By demanding that the military reestablish the order in Algiers, the authorities had implicitly condoned summary executions. When Aussaresses felt that more explicit instructions were in order, the government clearly reaffirmed the use of summary executions.

"Everyone knew," Aussaresses said, "everyone knew." The government had given the green light.

Blind Retaliation

The FLN sought revenge but did not have the courage to attack the parachutists directly. They struck blindly with sporadic assassination attempts, and their efforts to identify the paratrooper operatives were relatively unsuccessful. They tried to hit the COs of the units whose names appeared in



The stark landscape that covers most of the Algerian desert is very unforgiving but not as unforgiving as the troops under Gen. Aussasseres.

the journals. However, their intelligence was faulty.

Aussaresses remained anonymous by having no contact with the press and posing as a low level bureaucrat. No one suspected that he was the officer in charge of the counter-terrorism effort, and only Massu and a few officers of the 10th DP knew. He never carried arms, following the example of a commander Clauson in Indochina who had always said that in the presence of his battalion he had no need.

The visible paratroopers then became targets.

For instance, one assassin attempted to kill Bigeard, the French justice official stationed in Algiers, whom they had heard was approximately 6-foot, blond with blue eyes. Two blond men were strolling in the street, Bigeard and Mayer, same height, same uniform, same blond hair, same blue eyes. The two men unexpectedly changed direction and turned into a tobacco shop. The murderers planned to kill both men, without knowing which one was Begeard. However, the attempted assassination was thwarted by the timely arrival of a patrol.

Some time later another team of hit men assigned to liquidate Bigeard riddled the body of a sergeant major that resembled him.

An assassination attempt on General Salan, commander in Chief of the regional military, failed, and Massu called Aussaresses and Tringuier and "gave them hell."

"That is how you take care of the rebels — allowing them to make one assassination attempt after the other?" He was blaming them for the murders.

"This affair is absolutely not within our mission," replied Aussaresses.

"Not in your mission? You are here to liquidate the terrorists, aren't you?" Massu demanded.

"Yes, we are here to liquidate the FLN terrorists. But the FLN was not responsible for this action ... the FLN is not that sophisticated. My intuition tells me that it was the Cocos (Communists) Special services, namely the team of Andre Moine ... the leader of a secret cell that had experts in arms and explosives. The submachine gun came from the cache of arms used by the Cocos in the attacks. I found the fels working with the CPA (Algerian Communist party) in Philippeville." Aussaresses said.

"What are you waiting for before you arrest Andre Moine?"

Aussaresses redirected the focus of his investigation on the CPA, which was expedited by the fact that the terrorists had left their Panzerfaust behind. The assassin was identified as Philippe Castille, a Pied Noir who had been under Aussaresses in Indochina. Castille had become involved with a Doctor Kovacs, a high-ranking communist party functionary, who he had met while Kovacs was serving as a military doctor in Italy in WWII. Kovacs, now operating in Algiers, had decided to assassinate Salon with a submachinegun. Castille, who was in charge of the assassination team, preferred using the Panzerfaust. He had Salan's office under surveillance and fired the bazooka round into the office shortly after Salan entered. However, Salan had exited his office through a secret underground tunnel. Unfortunately, the projectile hit his assistant, who had made the mistake of relaxing in his chief's armchair.

Next issue, "Payback Time." With the "suicides" of the two heads of the FLN, Ben M'Hidi and Mâitre Boumendjel, and a battle won - the defeat of the FLN was ensured.

Dr. Martin Brass is a frequent contributor to SOF. X



Bear Over The Mountain Continued from page 51

convoy escort duties and security functions and so on.

Another interesting sidelight is that practically all the equipment and uniforms issued to the Soviet Army in Afghanistan were unsuitable. They were uncomfortable and inhibited movement. Also, their army boots were not the sort that should have been issued for ambush work. They, too, were uncomfortable. They were also noisy when they shouldn't have been (and would sometimes compromise a Soviet presence) and last, they were too heavy for mountain climbing. Also, their tracks easily identified by Mujahideen scouts.

One of the observations made is that Soviet troops made little effort to clean up after they had bivouacked in an area overnight. The area would be strewn with ration packs and other detritus including cigarette butts. That can only mean that the troops were allowed to smoke while laid up in the dark: an absurd condition if you consider that Russian tobacco is of the pungent variety and can be smelled for miles in the fresh Afghan mountain air. One can only speculate what other security transgressions were allowed.

Then there's the quality of equipment issued to Soviet forces in Afghanistan, of which much was shoddy and not suited to the rigors of such a difficult land. Sleeping bags, for instance, were made of cotton and offered no succor when it rained. Grau notes that the premier trophy for a Soviet soldier was a Muj sleeping bag from the West.

On morale, there were some serious problems. During the war, Soviet youth increasingly tried to avoid the draft and Afghanistan duty. "Large bribes were paid to exempt or safeguard the children of the privileged."

Consequently, a disproportionate number of youths from factories and collective farms served in this Asian theater. And it didn't help that they were told during training that going to fight Chinese and American mercenaries.

"When they finally got to Afghanistan they soon discovered that they were unwelcome occupiers in a hostile land," concludes Grau.

Lester W. Grau is the author of The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, ISBS, 5804 N.E. Hassalo Street, Portland OR 97213-3644; phone: 800-944-6190; website: http://www.frankcass.com.

Been There, Done That

Continued from page 66

but for three months so your body actually starts adapting.

SOF: To what do you credit the success of Soviet missions in Afghanistan?

Andrei: To supreme training and supreme weaponry.

SOF: To what do you credit the failure of Soviet missions in Afghanistan?

Andrei: Dumb commanders, and poor work with intelligence. Most of them were due to poor decisions made by officers.

SOF: Why did Russia first go into Afghanistan?

Andrei: That is the question I am looking the answer for.

SOF: What will be the greatest threat U.S. Special Forces will have to face in Afghanistan?

Andrei: The same that we had, the

same thing. First you have to realize where their allegiance lies, when you come over their with a smile and hand out chocolate bars to their children you do not necessarily buy their loyalty. You have to realize that their loyalty lies with Allah. You are not Muslim so you are infidel. Taliban is Muslim, so they are their brother. So that is what they have to realize. The food drops they are doing now is not going to buy them anything. These people have to realize these people have been at war at for 20 years. They have seen everybody, the Brits, the Russians, everybody. The biggest thing will be the treachery. They'll smile, take your candy bar, and say thank you very much, good ol' Americans. Then when you leave the village, they'll tell the local Taliban leader where you went, how many people, how you're armed, and so on and so on. So they ambush you.

Then next one is the weather. Right now winter is approaching. From what I've seen of U.S. extreme cold weather equipment, none of it will hold up in the mountains. All that layering bullshit, with the winds that they have in the mountains, is not gonna work. So they're gonna have to rethink that.

And another one will be the treacherous terrain where equipment like the Black Hawk and Apache cannot operate. Altitude, contamination by dust, dirt, and grime, which is everywhere you step. That will be another one. I'll say, the locals, the weather, the terrain, and the equipment. And I'm not saying it will or won't work, I'm just saying this is where they should be looking. I'm sure the training of the guys are adequate, they know their stuff, their weapons are functional, they just haven't been there.

SOF: Andrei, thanks for sharing your experiences with us and our readers.

Andrei: I just hope that you learn from our mistakes and that all the boys over there make it home safely. I hope that the American people don't have to go through what our parents and relatives had to go through with the loss of loved ones. By God, I hope they don't draw themselves into a long, bleeding conflict. If they're gonna execute it I hope they're gonna use strategies over there like they say they're gonna, in and out quick. Because those people will not be ruled.

David M. Fortier is a frequent contributor to SOF. \mathfrak{R}

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The Rockets' Red Glare

Continued from page 39

more munitions ASAP had shifted south of the mountains. Straddling the mountains were two precarious lifelines neither capable of moving much quickly.

One was the UF's small fleet of Mi-17 helicopters. Ideally, to resupply a war across a country as wide and rugged as Afghanistan the UF could use a minimum of 20 such choppers. What they have is just six transports plus a pair of Mi-35 Hind gunships. These are fully stretched not only moving munitions and personnel between the northern front and the Panjshir valley but also resupplying as far as possible the guerrilla pockets far beyond the UF's northeastern base area. And they're often grounded by bad weather or even cloud cover over the Khawak Pass which they need to negotiate when crossing the spine of the Hind Kush. With a clearance over the pass of just a couple of hundred feet that's one ride it's nice to see exactly where you're going.

The alternative link is overland. And with choppers grounded by a week of bad weather this was the way I reached the war. The route leads from the UF HQ at Khwaja Bahauddin on the Tajikistan border down through Badakhshan province Winding south through the town of Faizabad into the heart of the Hindu Kush in southern Badakhshan. Then it swings southwest to cross the 13,000 foot Anjoman Pass into the upper Panjshir. One hundred klicks later the Panjshir debouches onto the Shomali plain within sight of Bagram airbase and the front. On the map simple enough.

On the ground it's something else. To call this route a road would be ludicrously complementary. For most of its length of 300 bone-jarring klicks it's a rock-strewn donkey-track along which vehicles grind and sway in clouds of fine, swirling dust. In this terrain 4WD drive is no suburban status symbol: without it you don't move. The toll on vehicles is brutal and major breakdowns are par for the course. That's when you don't lose the whole vehicle: Having stalled on a steep incline between a rock face and a precipice dropping to a foaming river, my own driver panicked and jumped out as the jeep slid back. Mercifully, it crashed into the rock face rather tipping over into the river. Four days after setting out we limped into the lower Panjshir with a leaking fuel lead and a clutch in state of terminal disintegration.

This was the line of supply along which most munitions and POL reaches UF forces on the Kabul front. So on arrival at front-line positions it came as no big surprise to UF troops chronically short of ammo and for any "Big Push" on the capital. Unless the USAF turned its attention to seriously degrading Taliban armored and artillery assets and manpower in the Forward Edge of Battle Area, it seemed clear the UF was going nowhere fast.

That Washington appeared in no hurry to do that over one week into the air war suggested one thing very clearly: Pakistan's military — which, bear in mind, was largely responsible for creating and sustaining the Taliban in the first place — was now desperate to avoid the anti-Taliban UF coming anywhere near Kabul or exercising a decisive voice in the formation of a new government. Washington, which to its cost, has generally deferred to Islamabad over Afghan policy, was once again going along with Islamabad's demands. And, as usual, Islamabad was demanding - now openly - a decisive say in the shape of the government in neighboring Afghanistan.

The idea that Islamabad somehow has the right to decide who should or should not rule in Kabul has long been part of the military mindset in Pakistan. This attitude reduces Afghanistan to something approaching a Pakistani province, too important for Islamabad's own security to be allowed to decide its own fate. Since 1992 Pakistan's determination to install its own candidate on the throne of Kabul resulted first in the destruction of Kabul under the rockets of the extremist mujaideen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hizb-i-Islami; and secondly imposed upon the Afghan people the Taliban and their terrorist cohorts — monsters the military Frankensteins in Islamabad were unable to control but which they continued to sustain and indulge until the bitter end.

It remains to be seen whether, in the wake of the catastrophic foreign policy failure of its Taliban adventure, Islamabad will attempt to set up yet another Afghan candidate to secure its interests in Afghanistan. If it does, one thing is sure: there will be no peace or stability in Afghanistan and the spectre of terrorism will remain to plague the region and the world.

Mike Winchester, a frequent SOF correspondent, has been in Afghanistan since mid-September. \Re

CIA Revelations

Continued from page 32

to say that planes are not safe, that the pilots need guns, the media play the story as an extreme measure.

The media commissars would have none of it, even if arming pilots was an appropriate measure that would have immediately instilled confidence in the public to fly.

Instead, the media gave a lot of air time to Patricia Friend, president of the Association of Flight Attendants. She told Congress she opposed arming pilots. Hearing her, I was left wondering if she was awake on Sept. 11. Did she also think the planes were a place for box cutters of the type used to slit the throats of her members?

Then I realized that Patricia Friend was a P.C. robot.

Since her first anti-gun comments, Friend has modified her position, probably after her shaken membership sent her a wake-up call of their own.

By week's end, Friend was saying that pilots shouldn't be allowed to carry guns, that instead flight attendants should be armed with "stun guns," which she called "the weapon of choice."

Friend must have thought it outrageous and in contravention to all P.C. theology that the pilots (mostly males) would be armed but the attendants (mostly female) would not be.

Of course, any sane person realizes that giving flight attendants any sort of gun would be like giving it directly to potential hijackers. Would you want to fly on an airline that armed the stewardesses with stun guns?

In the wake of Sept. 11, can't we see the danger of political correctness and how it has crippled this great nation?

Aren't our potential enemies, bigger than Osama and with weapons capable of destroying every major city in America, watching carefully our response to Sept. 11? Do you believe our enemies have been encouraged or discouraged that the government, the media and the victimized airline stewardesses don't want to arm pilots even after living through Sept. 11?

If you dig a bit deeper, you will realize how P.C.-thinking and its commissars got us into the mess of Sept. 11 and what troubles lie ahead.

America must break its P.C. chains soon to ensure that the barbarians don't destroy us.

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dis-Order Of Battle

Continued from page 43

(including about 40 combat aircraft and an assortment of transport planes and helicopters) are under Taliban control. The Taliban "air force" amounts to only about 20 aging Soviet Su-20 and Su-22 Fitter ground-attack aircraft (the unsophisticated export models of the Su-17 Fitter-D fighter-bomber) although it's reported that only four are operational; maybe five to 10 MiG-21 Fishbed fighters, and a few Mi-35 Hind-D attack helicopters.

They may also have operational MiG-23 and MiG-27 Floggers, and Su-Frogfoot swing-wing fighter-25 bombers. They also have a number of Antonov transport planes which could be used a bombers. The Taliban have also converted a few II-39 trainer aircraft to bombers. Their aircraft are based in Kabul, Kandahar, Shindand, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif. Most of the planes have outlived their operational age, and many are not technically safe to fly. Many of the aircraft may not be operational or sustainable for more than limited air combat operations.

Given the lackluster performance of the better-trained and -equipped Iraqi Air Force against Coalition air assets during the Gulf War, it's even doubtful they would send up their 20-30 Mig-21 and Su-22 fighters against Western air forces. The only military jet aircraft I saw in Afghanistan were at the Kabul airfield, which has now been bombed.

The Taliban may have as few as five Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters, but this is a versatile airborne weapons platform: It mounts an undernose 12.7mm machinegun, 57mm rocket pods which can use HE, White Phosphorus, and incendiary munitions. The Mi-24 can also deploy CBUs (cluster bomb units) or minelet pods. The number of these left behind by the Soviets is thought to be minimal. A small number (estimated six) of Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip series transport helicopters exists. Three helicopters that recently flew into Pakistan were seized by the Pakistani military.

Defending Afghanistan on the ground will be the ZSU 23-4, an antiaircraft weapon mounting four 23mm cannons and a "Gun Dish" radar for fire control. The radars are probably not operational. The Taliban also have what appear to be ZPU 14-1s antiaircraft cannon.

Their SAM-2 Dvina and SAM-3 Pechura antiaircraft missiles are long

obsolete. However, the Taliban inherited at least 100 U.S. Stinger light ground-to-air missiles dating from the 1980s. from the mujahideen. Serviceability may be an issue as well as training. Quantities of a similar, though less sophisticated Soviet system, the Grail-7 "Strela" (Arrow) with a range of 3,700 meters, may also be on hand and could be purchased readily on the arms black market. Still, the SA-7 is of limited use against modern jet aircraft — in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War the Egyptians and Syrians fired 5,000 SA-7s and accounted for only 4 Israeli aircraft shot down and 28 damaged. Poorly designed and manufactured, these weapons have a limited shelf life.

The presence of air-defense weapons, however limited, may very well keep U.S. fighter-bombers above a 5,000-meter ceiling. The Stingers (it should be noted that it takes a good deal of training to turn out a proficient Stinger operator) and other air-defense weapons are a serious threat to attackand transport-helicopters, both of which could be expected to be used in conjunction with what might only be a limited ground campaign carried out by special operations units.

Using ground-to-air missiles the mujahideen inflicted a heavy toll on Soviet helicopter gunships, but mostly in daytime attacks.

Scud Missiles

The Taliban have Soviet surface-tosurface rockets left over from the 1980s. The Taliban wild card is their 20, or so, Scud and Frog surface-to-surface missiles. SS-1c/Scud-B ground-toground missiles have a range of 280-300 kilometers and Frog-7 Luna missiles with a range of 70 kilometers. While the Taliban is known to have several Scud launchers there are only about 20 projectiles in Afghanistan. These heavy weapons were left behind by the retreating Soviet units or belonged to former DRA Army units. Their crews are mostly ex-Afghan Army specialists trained in former Afghan Army missile units under Russian supervision. In theory, the Taliban can use these missiles to strike targets in surrounding countries, especially Pakistan and Tajikistan.

SOF Chief Foreign Correspondent Rob Krott, a former U.S. Army officer, has made two trips into Afghanistan. He has written extensively on Afghan demining operations and "observed" Taliban fighters in combat near Bagram in 1998. X Sound Off

BY COL. DAVID H. HACKWORTH (RET.)

Let's Lock And Load Now!

S hooting first and straight while on a battlefield or a security detail is a matter of life or death. That's why weapons training normally gets the highest priority in the U.S. military.

If you're slow on the draw, you're dead, and your side loses.

Just ask the Marine guard in Lebanon in 1983 who didn't shoot fast enough when a kamikaze driver rammed his terror truck through the gate. It took the leatherneck one full second to chamber a round, another second to flip his weapon off safety and fire. By that time, the truck had smacked into the Marine billet he was securing and exploded. The Rules of Engagement forbade this expert rifleman from being locked and loaded even though his unit was on high alert for just such an attack. And those two seconds he lost arming his weapon cost 241 American lives.

Lesson learned: An unloaded weapon is useless; a lesson we've unfortunately learned and relearned the hard way over and over again.

Recently, the Navy dedicated a memorial to the sailors who were aboard the U.S.S. Cole when it was savaged last year by a terrorist attack in the port of Aden.

But even though the members of the security detail on the Cole were at their posts on high alert — in an extremely dangerous port where they'd already been warned that a terrorist attack was highly probable — not one of their weapons had a round in the chamber. The security detail gave the small craft that almost sank the Cole and killed 17 sailors a big, friendly America wave, and the terrorists waved back — just before they rammed their human torpedo into the ship. Again, the Rules of Engagement stated no weapons would have a round in the chamber.

Not having a magazine in a weapon, even for a crackerjack marksman, adds at least two more seconds before he or she can get off a round. Four seconds is more than enough time to drive a 10,000-gallon gas tanker into a nuclear reactor, a high school, a chemical plant or some other tempting target.

Yet today, at virtually every U.S. military installation around the globe — and now at most of our airports, which are secured by the Army National Guard — the guys and gals manning the security details at exterior gates and other critical or sensitive areas, including ammo dumps and



Col. David Hackworth (Ret.) also writes a syndicated weekly column titled "Defending America." "Hack" doesn't pull any punches and many liberal rags won't carry his writing. If your local paper falls into that category, call the editor and let him know you'd like to see "Defending America" on the Op-Ed page. It's syndicated by King Features, 235 E. 45th St., New York, NY 10017.

armories, are as impotent as the Marines were in Lebanon or the sailors in Yemen. They don't have a round in the chamber, and in most cases, they don't even have a magazine in their weapon. Yet America is at war, and we know that thousands of fanatics are out there ready to strike.

When I was a 15-year-old soldier in Italy right after World War II, I "walked my post in a military manner" with a *loaded* M1 rifle. My sergeant, captain, colonel and general trusted me, along with thousands of other young soldiers, not to shoot myself or anyone else who didn't deserve shooting.

But somewhere along the way that trust disappeared. In today's military, a leader makes one mistake and he or she is toast. So the brass do the big CYA thing to ensure that they don't get burned. As a result, uniformed MBA-types have made micromanagement a General Order. In a military where a soldier gets busted for drunken driving and his captain is threatened with relief, imagine what an accidental rifle discharge would bring.

Last week in Germany, where some guards were ordered to tape their rifles' magazine wells for safety, four-star General Montgomery C. Meigs actually charged his colonels with checking on the guards and reporting back to him. A job the corporal of the guard used to do when careers weren't at stake.

The other key factor in the mix is that the troops — less the Marine Corps and special units such as the Rangers haven't been getting the training time they need on the firing range to be fully competent with their individual weapons.

Even though there are millions of bucks for higher headquarters' simulation war-game-playing for military planners and the brass, nowhere near enough money has been allocated for putting holes in targets.

Will it take another U.S.S. Cole disaster before we allow the troops to lock and load?

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page.

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Hackworth's novel, The Price of Honor, is now available. X

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